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r. L'1TRODUCTION 
A The Insiders for Gambling Lawsuits 
As the insider Jeffrey Wigand came forward to raWe the U.S. tobacco 
industry/ insiders within the U.s. and Australian gambling establish-
ments began to go public as the twenty-first century began. By 2002 
goycmment officials, scholars. and social activists who were experts on 
the gambling industry believed that some of the next big industry 
.. Professor, University ofDlinois. College ofWilJiam and Mary (A.B., 1972); University 
of Georgia (J.D., 1976; M.B.A., 1977); University or Virginia (LL.M., 1978; S.J.D., 1981). 
Eric Berg, Tyler Baker, Ilnd Benjamin Burnham provided valuable a~si!tance in updating, 
cite·che<:king, and editing this analysis. The author and editors attempted to delete 
~f('rences and source materials too heavily influenced by progambling interests or other 
5podal interests-unless identified 8.S such. For an analysis of public concerns in these 
iuue areas, see, e.g" John W. Kindt, The COlJts of Addicted Gamble,.,: Should the Staus 
lniliale Mega-Lawsuits Simi14r 10 tlte Tobacco Cases?, 22 MANAGERlAL & DEC. ECO~. 17, 
19·21,27-28,31-32 (2001). 
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lawsuits would be targeted at gambling facilities. 2 Gambling opponents 
argued that casinos and gambling facilities fueled gambling addiction 
and pursued players who had gambling addiction problems, even after 
those players complained to the gambling facility and asked to be 
banned.3 Casino owners maintained that their industry was not the 
cause of gambling addiction.4 Reportedly concurring with this viewpoint 
was Keith Whyte, head of the National Council on Problem Gambling 
(NePG), who was previously employed by the American Gaming 
Association (AGA), the gambling industry's lobbying group. Whyte 
stated that "[c]ausation would be very difficult to prove,"~ although 
2. See, e.g., John W. Kindt, The Costs of Addicted Gamblers: Should the States Initiate 
Mega-lAwsuits Similar to the To/mew Cases?, 22 MANAGERlAl & DEC. ECON. 17 (2001) 
[hereinafter Mega-Lawsuits]; Judy Dehaven & Kate Cos~arelli, Gamblir18 Industry Likely 
Target for Next Big SUIt, HONOLlIT.U STAR-BULL., June 25, 2002, at C6 [hereinafWr 
Gambling LiJuly Target]. 
3. Gamblir18 Likely Target, supra note 2, at C6. For the diagnostic criteria for 
delimiting a pathological (~addicted~) gambler, see AM. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC & 
STATISTICAL ~1A."''UAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 615·18, § 312.31 (4th ed. 1994) ("pathological 
gambling") {hereinafter DSM-IVJ. 
4. Gamblir18 Likely Target, supra note 2, at C6. 
5. Id. (quoting Keith Whyte). The National Council on Problem Gambling (NCPG) has 
been ~riticized for having both substantial financial and administrative links to 
progambling interests and for trying to dominate U.S. problem gambling services, In 2003 
the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justi~e published a proposed Final 
Judgment, Stipulation and Competitive Impact Statement in the ~ase of United Slates u. 
National Q.uneiJ on Problem Gambling, Inc., Civil A~tion No. 1:03CV01279 (filed June 13. 
2003) "to obtain equitable and other relief to prevent and restrain violations of Section 1 
of the Sherman Act." 68 Fed. Reg. 38090-98 (June 26, 2003). The proposed Final 
Judgment el\joined the defendant NCPG from directly or indirectly 
A. Initiating, adopting, or pursuing any agreement, program, or policy that has 
the purpose or effect of prohibiting or restraining any PGSP [problem gambling 
services provider] from engaging in the following practices: (1) selling problem 
gambling services in any state or territory or to any customer; or (2) submitting 
competitive bids in any state or territory or to any customer. 
B. Adopting, disseminating, publishing, seeking adherence 00, facilitating, or 
enforcing any agreement, code of ethics, rule, bylaw, resolution, policy, guideline, 
standard, certification, or statement tha.t has thc purpose or effect of prohibiting 
or restraining any PGSP from engaging in any of the practices identified in 
Section HA) abo~l ... , 
68 Fed. Reg. 38092 (2003). For public comments, ineluding the "interesting i6sues" which 
the Antitrust Division indicated were raised by Professors Joseph E. Finnerty, James A 
Gentry, Fred Gottheil, and John Warren Kindt (i,e., Gambling Research Group), see 68 
Fed. Reg, 55654-M (Sept. 26, 2003). See (1/00 Mega.Lawsuiu, supro note 2, at 31-32. 
For an example of problematic legislation interfacing with the NCPG, see South Carolina 
EdUcation Lottery Act § 59-150-230(1) (Supp. 2002) (~A portion ... of the unclaimed prize 
money, .. must be allocated ... to the South Carolina Department of A1oohol and Other 
Drug Abuse Services or an established nonprofit public or private agency recognized as an 
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several academics and experts disagreed.6 
B. The "Pandora's Box" of the Gambling Industry: The Legal 
Discovery of Information 
531 
The ga mbling industry and its associates apparently have a quantum 
of in·house information that. may make legalized gambling interests 
vulnerable to a cornucopia of lawsuits by attorneys general and 
plaintiffs' aLtorneys. After filing cases in many issue areas, trial lawyers 
were well-advised to watch for the insiders/ who could reveal any 
potential destnIction of relevant documents or concomitant obstruction 
of justice, as in the tobacco cases.8 This type of pot.ential scenario was 
highlighted in 2001 and 2002 with the felony conviction of Arthur 
Andersen for obstructing a federal investigation of the EnroD Corpora-
tion.9 
With regard to progambling interests, the political history indicates a 
preoccupation with keeping all information in-house and UDder control. 
In 1996 during the formation of the National Gambling Impact Study 
Commission ('"NGISCn or "1996-1999 Commissionn), the lobbyists for 
U.S. gambling interests lobbied desperately to get the subpoena power 
affiliate of the Nation al Council on. Problem Gambling. , .. " (emphasis added». See also 
Testimony of Aasoc. Praf. Howard Shaffer, Ph. D., Editor, Jourrw.l of Gambling Studies 
(official publication of the National Council on Problem Gambling), in Boan el oJ. [j. CoUins 
Entertainment Co. et 01 .• CA. No. 3:97-2136-17 (S.C. Dist, J une 18, 2008) (cross-
examination by plaintiffs counsel Lawrence E. Richter, Jr.). 
6. Gambling Likely Targel, lIupra note 2, at C6; Alisyn Camel'(lta, Tort Lawyers Target 
Gambling, Fox News Channel Online, at bU.p:ilv.ww .foxnew8.oom/storylO,2933,54083,OO.ht-
ml (May 31, 2(02). 
7. Sn THE INSIDER, supra oote 1. Set! g€TU!raJiy John W. Kindt, Subpoerwing 
Infornw.tion from the Gambling IndlUlt'J': Will the DiIl(XJ[}/Z'J' Procen in Cwil Lawsuits 
Reveal Hidden Violations Ineluding tM Rac/uteer Influenced and Corrupt OrganiUltions 
Act?, S2 OR. L. REv. 221 (2003) [hereinafter Subpoenaing Disoovery Reveal Hidden Viola· 
tio/l.sJ. 
S. RoBIN REID BOSWEU, Ass'N OF TRIAL LAWYERS OF AM., OSTAINING THE CASINO'S 
IN~'OHMAT[ON 11:1783 (2002) (annual convention reference materials). 
9. Kurt Ei~henwald & Floyd Norris, Early Verdict on Audit: Procedures Ignored, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 6. 2002, at C6; The Foil of Ande/1ll!!n: Greed Tarnished GoitUn IUpulation, 
Cm. Tam., Sept. 1, 2002, § 1, at 1. See also Tkt. Corporntl! and Auditing Accou.ntabillty, 
Responsibility, and Trnnsparency Act of 2002: Hearing on H,R. 3763 &fore the House 
Comm. on Fin. Serv., 107t.h Cong" 2d Se!;s. (2002) (statement of Michael G. Oxley, 
Chairman, Comm. on Fin. Serv.), aooilabLe at http://financiaiJervices.house.gov/ hear 
inp.asp?formmode-detail&hearings96; Plan Filed by Enron Leaves Little for Creditors, 
NEWs-GAZE'M'E (Champaign, IL), July 11,2003, atAI,AS (reporting that bankruptErmm's 
creditors will receive 14.4 to 18.3 cents on the dollar, while bankrupt WorldCom's creditors 
wiJI receive 36 cents en the dollar). 
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stricken from the authority of the Commission,lD The legislative 
sponsors of the 1996·1999 Commission/I such as U.s. Senators Paul 
Simon CD-Ill,) and Richard Lugar (R·IndJ as well as Charles Morin,12 
chair of the 1976-1977 U.S. Commission on the Review of the National 
Policy Toward Gambling,I3 strongly opposed the lobbyists' efforts to 
strip the subpoena powers from the NGISC.l~ 
Two types of subpoena powers were at issue: (1) subpoenas to testify 
(i.e., subpoenas ad testificandum).l~ and (2) subpoenas to produce 
documents (i.e. , subpoenas duces tecum).16 In the final legislation, the 
Commission's subpoena power to compel testimony from witnesses, such 
as company executives, was stripped, l' However, the Commission 
retained the power to subpoena documents,l& 
k; the debate intensified over the extent of the Commission's 
subpoena powers, it became apparent that the progambling interests 
were steadfastly against pennitting any process which would allow for 
t.he legal discovery of information. 19 The major trade magazine for the 
gambling industry, International Gaming and Wagering Business,20 
referenced its Washington contacts to reassure its readership. 
"'.Vashington sources also report it's likely t.hat a Senate bill-not the 
House bill that was passed several months ago-will be adopted. The 
Senate version would not empower the commission to subpoena records 
of casino operators. ,,21 
10. SUlte IniKJIoement Sought in Gaming Study BIll, INTL GAMING & WAGERING Bus., 
May 1996, at 22 (I.rade Inllgnzine for the p.mbhng Industry] [hereinafter Gaming 
Interference]; Kenneth Pins, Federal Study of Gambling'. Effects Shelved, DES MOINES 
REG., J une 19, 1996 [hereinal\.er S/udy Shelved}; Warren Richey, AlIti-Gambling Actll.uts 
Warn of Staclted Commission Deck , CHRISTIAN Sci MO:-'TI'OR, Mar. 21, 1997, al3 
[hereinafter SUlcired CommiSSlO1i Deck} ; see also John W. Kindt, Follow the Maney: 
Gambling, EthiCS, and Subpol!nas, 556 ANNALS AM. ACAD. Pol.... & SOC. SCI. 86 (1998) 
thereinafter Follow the Money}. 
11. See Study Shelved, supra note 10. 
12. Letter from Charles H. Morin, Chair, 1976 U.S. Comm'n on the Rev. of the Nat'l 
Policy toward Gambling, to Frank R. Wolf, Congressman (May 7, 1996) [hereinafter Chair 
Charles Morin Letterl (on file with Charles H. Monn). 
13. COMM'N ON THE REv. OF THE NAT'L PoLICY TOWARD GAMBLING, GAMBLING IN 
AMERICA, FINAL REPORT (1976) [hereinafter U.S. CO!olM'N GAMBLING]. 
14. Chair Charle& Morin Letter, supra note 12; Study SM/oed, supra note 10. 
15. Bt.AcK's LAw DICTIONARY 1440 (7th ed. 1999) 
16. ld. 
17. National Gambling Impact Study Commiuion Act, Pub. L. No. 104-169. ItO Stat.. 
1482 (1996); see supra noteS 10-14 and accompanying teXt. 
18. Pub. L. No. 104-189, 110 Stat. § 5{b). 
19. See liupra Dotes 10-14 and accompanying text. 
20. Gaming Interfertnce, supra note 10, at 22. 
21. ld. 
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The gambling industry favored the Senate bill. presumably because 
there was more opportunity to influence or even control the information 
that would be forwarded to the 1996-1999 Commission.22 
If the Senate bill is adopted, as is expected, it is proposed that a 
study group would gather information, which would be delivered to the 
commission. Early speculation has members of the Washington-based 
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR), of which 
[Nevada Governor Robert] Miller is one of27 members, comprising the 
study groUp.23 
These types of industry maneuvers to control information outraged the 
Congressional sponsors of the Commission.24 
During this timeframe, U.S. Representative John Ensign (R-Nev.), who 
had family in the gambling indUStry,2S worked to eliminate the 
Commission's subpoena powers.26 "Ensign said members of the AGIR 
would gather information on gaming and present it to the gaming 
commission. Just as important, Ensign said, are the assurances he's 
received that the subpoena powers of the commission contained in the 
House bill are not included in the Senate bill.,.'27 
Despite these efforts to control the information going to the 1996-1999 
Commission and to eliminate the Commission's subpoena powers, the 
Commission still retained a large degree of informational independence 
as well as the power to subpoena documents (but not witnesses). For 
attorneys general and plaintiffs' attorneys, however, the salient part of 
this scenario was to highlight the gambling industry's Pandora's 
Box- paranoia involving the legal discovery of information. Further-
more, the gambling industry, its associates, and organizations would 
have difficulty limiting the scope of discovery in many instances. The 
scope would depend on which gambling issues were addressed, but 
because gambling issues are by nature interrelated, the Pandora's Box 
could be almosl impossible to control. 
22. ld. 
23. ld. 
24. Stacked Commission Deck, supra note 10; Study Shelved, supra note 10. 
25. See Gaming In/erfe71!flce, supra note 10, at 22. 
26. Id. 
27. ld. 
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c. Does the Obfuscation or Control of Information Detrimental to 
Gambling Facilities by Progambling Interests Enhance Plaintiffs' Cases? 
The Interface with Qui Tam Causes of Action and Principles 
While various forms of gambling activities were being decriminalized 
during the last two decades of the twentieth century, pfogambling 
interests reportedly denied the existence of health care costs and other 
costs associated with legalized gambling activities.2S The policies and 
actions to suppress, obfuscate, or control studies or information reflecting 
poorly on the gambling industry could interface with future qui tam 
actions where an individual can file suit like a "private attorney general" 
on behalf of the government. An example of a potential cause of action 
interfaces with the health care costs attributed to pathological gamblers. 
Enacted in 1863 to curb military procurement fraud, the False Claims 
Act (FCA)29 allows the U.S. government and private plaintiffs (called 
"relators") to recover damages from any person or organization that 
knowingly presented, or caused another party to present, a false or 
fraudulent payment claim tQ the government.ao Recovery amounts 
included the costs of the action, fines up to $11,000 per claim, and treble 
the government's damages.31 Historically in common use, "[ten] of the 
first [fourteen] statutes enacted by the first United States Congress 
relied on qui tam actions to aid the police enforcement role of govern-
ment agencies.'>32 FCA actions constitute a type of qui tam action, 
which is the short form of the Latin phrase, qui tam pro domino rege 
quam pro si ipso in hac parte sequitur which translates to "who as well 
for the King as for himself sues in this matter."33 The legal definition 
of a qui tam action is: "An action brought under a statute that allows a 
private person to sue for a penalty, part of which the government or 
28. See, e.g., Rex Buntain, There's a Probkm in the Hou.$!., INT'L GAMING & WAGERING 
Bus., July 1996, at 1 (trade magazine for the gambling industry); Matt Connor, Gambling's 
Ball and Chain, Ir.'l'L GAMING & WAGERING Bus., Oct. 1996, at 64 (trade magazine for the 
gambling industry); David Ferrell & Matea Gold, Casino Industry Fights an Emerging 
Backlash, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1998, at Al [hereinafter Casino Backlashl; Damon Hodge, 
Problem Gambling: &location of Gaming Center Prai$!.d, LAs VEGAS REV. J., Nov. 4,2000, 
at 30, See al8a Mega·Lawsuits, su.pra note 2, at 44-63, this. AI-A 14. 
29. 31 U.s.C, §§ 3729-33 (1983); see also Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996, 28 
C.F.R. § 85.3 (2001) (increasing the civil monetary awards). 
30. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a}(7). 
31. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a); 28 C.F.R. § 85.3. 
32. THOMAS R. GRANDE & DAVIS LEVIN LIvINGSTON GRANDE, Ass'N OFTRlAL LAWYERS 
OF AM., An Overview af the Federal False ClaimB Act [:1179 (2002) (annual convention 
reference materials). See United States ex rei. Newsham v. Lockheed Missi les & Space Co., 
722 F. Supp. 607, 609 (N.D. Cal. 1989). 
33. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1262 (7th 00. 1999). 
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some specified public institution will receive.";w Between 1986 and 
1999, over 3000 suits were filed using this cause of action-primarily in 
the health care industry.3s 
D. The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) 
and Other Causes of Action 
One of the primary areas of Jegal vulnerability for gambling facilities 
was RIC038 and its parallel state legislation.a? RICO actions ap· 
peated to cover many potential scenarios involving gambling facilities. 
Kansas City attorney Stephen Bradley Small has sued casinos «a 
number of times" alleging for example, racketeering.88 
He has handled a racketeering case against the Kansas City casinos 
and has represented patrons who say they were wrongfully detained 
and accused of cheating. 
For ~premises liability a nd garden-variety personal i..Qj wy claims, 
reali ze that the casinos are self-insured, so be prepared to go to trial ,~ 
advised Small. "From a management perspective, they're paranoid 
about crimes their employees may commit and they fire people often , 
so employee claims against casinos are plentiful.-
In private civil cases, several potential causes of action were idenLi-
fied:40 (1) RICO (both federal and state); (2) premises liability; (3) 
tortious breaches of duty; (4) intentional infliction of emotional (and 
mental) distress; (5) negligent infliction of emotional (and mental) 
distress; (6) breach of contract (including self-exclusion contract); (7) 
breach of constructive or implied contract; (8) fraudulent misrepresenta-
t ion; (9) punitive damages; and (10) admiralty (perhaps)Y Obviously, 
other causes of action could be available depending on the factual 
scenarios. 
34. Id. 
35. RoBIN POTTER, Ass'N OF TRIAL LAWYERS OF AM., F ALSE CLAIMS AC'l' LITIGATION IN 
E MPLOYlIlEN1' CASES-A VrEW FROM PLAlr.'TlFFS'/RELA TORS' COUNSJo;L I: 1208 (2002) (annual 
convention reference materials). 
36. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2002). &egeTU!rally Subpoenaillg Discouery &/Jeai Hldde" 
Violatictls, supra note 7. 
37. See, e.g., IND. CoDE ANN. § 35·45-6-2 (Mkhiel998). 
38. Stephanie S. Maniscalco, ~Self-Exclu8ion~ Program May Create Duty, Mo. LAw. 
WKLY., Dec. 17, 2000, at 15 [hereinafter Self·Exclu8ionl. 
39. Id. 
40. See, e.g., Third Amended Complaint for Damages, Williams v. Aztar Indiana 
Gaming Corp. (S.D. Ind. 2002) (No. EV-Ol-75·C-YIH). 
41. Id. 
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II. DELIMITATION OF PROBLEMS 
A. Private Lawsuits against Gambling Facilities: Various Causes of 
Action: Protect the Surveillance Evidence of Big Brother Casino 
By the 1990s, several types of lawsuits were being filed against the 
rapidly spreading U.S. gambling facilities. These lawsuits included 
"'patron disputes over their winnings, slip-and-fal ls, employee rights, 
sexual harassment, premises liability, and casino-related automobile 
accidents .... u Fred Del Marva, a security expert and forensic investiga-
tor in over 350 cases, advised plaintiffs' attorneys that t he casinos 
would: 
fight you right to the ground. Make sure you can fina nce [your 
casel, forget about arbitration and mediation and forget about sending 
out a letter of demand. It's a waste of time. They'll take you all the 
way up unlil experl.8' depositions, then after that, maybe they'll start 
making decisions.4J 
The 2002 Chair of the Casino Litigation Group of the American Trial 
Lawyers Association, D. Briggs Smith, cautioned plaintiffs' attorneys to 
"protect the evidence."'" Attorneys need to obtain: U) the traini ng 
manuals; (2) the incident reports; (3) t he marketing manuals; (4) the 
electronic procedures for video s lot machines; and (5) surveillance tapes 
and devices (and their locations).45 The thousands of surveillance 
cameras and devices in each casino capture virtually every chip, slot 
machine, employee, customer, and a rea of the gambling facility 
(including elevators and hotel facilities). State regulations r equired that 
surveillance tapes and digitals be r etained for as little as six to 
thirty days;"'" therefore, quick action by pla intiffs was imperativeY 
Furthermore, some tribal casinos required a fi ling within as little as 
ten days, or the right to a lawsuit was forfeited. 48 
42. Diana Digges,ColJino·RelalJ!dLitieationon theRIS4!,LAWYERS WKLY. USA, Nov. 26, 
2001, at 17 (hereinafter COlJino-RewlJ!d Litigation). 
43. ld. at 17. 
44. ld. at 24. 
45. ld. 
46. ld. See generally BOswELL, supra note 8, at 1783 et seq. 
47 . See Terry NOJT9U1ger. PresentationfDiscuss:ion, Ca.rino Gami1l8 Litigation Group, 
Am. Trial Lawyers Au'n. 2002 Annual Convention, Atlanta, Ga ., July 20·24, 2002 (publie 
information from filed case complaint) [hereinafter Noffsinger PresentationJ. See generally 
BOSWELL, supra note 8. nt 1783 et seq. 
48. Casioo·RewlJ!d Lilieation. supra noU! 42, at 17. 
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B. Caveats on "Smoke and Mirrors": Expert Witnesses May Be 
Directly or Indirectly Funded by Progambling Interests 
537 
In finding potential expert witnesses in gambling related cases, 
plaintiffs' attorneys were well-advised to "follow the moner and then 
specifically determine the history and extent of direct and indirect 
funding sources for considerations involving legal impeachment. 
Furthermore, the same questions arose regarding studies which looked 
unimpeachable on their face but of'tcn were linked to funding via 
progambling special interest groUpS.30 
Finally, according to an analysis by the University of Massachusetts 
of several gambling industry reports, some gambling st.udies utilized by 
government decision makers to decriminalize gambling during the 19808 
and 19908 were notoriously "unbalanced" (Le., weighted toward 
progambling interests).51 Critics observed that most reports supported 
by progambling interests contained inaccuracies or omissions, and the 
reports were also discredited by internal "leaked" documents originating 
within the gambling industry.52 The analysis prepared by the Univer-
sity of Massachusetts reported eight "unbalanced" and two "mostly 
unbalanced" studies, primarily financed by progambling interesLs.&3 
The t hree "mostly balanced" studies were by independent government-
contracted groups, and t he only "balanced" report was by the University 
of New Orleans.64 
Prior to 1997, the most common and obvious shortcoming of most 
"so-called" studies financed or generated by progambling interests was 
the dearth , or even total absence, of documentation-particularly 
49. ~e CasiM 8(JcJr.lash, lIupra note 28. El t AI; St.ephen J . Simurda. When Gambling 
Cornu To Town; How to Cooera High-Stalu!, Story , COLUM. JOUIUoIALIS!.I REV., JanJFeb. 
1994, at 36-38 [herf!Lnaft.er When GambliJ18 Cornu to Town]; see generally John W. Kindt. 
Pollow the Money. IIupra note 10; John W. Kindt, Gambling vs. The Ne .... Untouchable~ : 
Credibility Concerns (or Academia, Criminl'll JUltice, and the U.S. Supreme Court. Addresl 
at Benjamin N. Cardozo Law School, Yeshiva Univ., New York, New York (Nov. 15·16, 
1999) (transcript on file with author). 
50. See Casino Badlash, supra note 28, at AI; see also COLUM. JOUNRALISM REV., 
IUpra. note 49, at 36-38; John W. Kindt., The Gambling Jnd~try and Acodemic Research: 
Have Gambling Monul Tainted the Research Environment', 13 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L .J. 1 
(2003) [hereinafter Gambling Mallie, Tainted lhe Research]. 
51. ROBERT GooDMAN, LEGALIzED GAMBLL"-G AS A STRATEGY FOR ECONOhllC 
DEVELOPMENl' (Cer. Econ. De"., U. Mass.-Amherst ed. 1994) [herelDafter CED REPORT]. 
52. For a discuSliion and listing of some well-known indulltry-oriented reportll, see 
J ohn W. Kindt, The Economic lmpacts of Legalized GamblingActiuitltl, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 
51,51-56 nn.3·43 [hereinafter Economic lmpacts]. 
63. See CEO REPORT, lupra note 51, at Exec. Summary, 68..g7. 
64. ld. 
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footnotes, specific citations, and source materials.55 Many industry-
financed studies simply failed facially for lack of documentation or 
research rigor. Since 1997. the few consequential analyses financed 
directly or indirectly by progambling interests, such as the Harvard 
Meta-anaiysis,l506 have been criticized for leaving out basic and essential 
information necessary for academic corroboration.57 
Studies financed by progambling interests can be criticized as "limited-
in-scope." Generally, the proper scope for socioeconomic studies of 
gambling issues was not utilized in studies supported by progambling 
interests. Richard Leone, a Commissioner on the U.S. Gambling 
Commission and President of the Century Foundation, complained that 
if the industry "can . . . keep the focus of the camera tight enough,"SS 
the results would constitute a distorted view of the actual costs and 
benefits of legalized gamblintY-and often highlight just the bene-
fits. 50 
The proper scope of review for most local socioeconomic analyses is the 
gambling industry's own 35-mile radius and lOO-mile radius around the 
gambling activity.6l These are the "feeder markets" supplying the 
gambling activity with gamblers, such as in the case of a casino.62 
55. See generally, CEO REPORT, supra note 51. 
56. Howard J. Shaffer et al., El:ltimating the Prevalence of Disordered Gambling 
Behavior in the United States and Canada: A Meta-analysIs, App. II (President and 
Fellows of Harvard College 1997) (hereinafter Harvard AddJctions Meta-analysisl; Press 
Release, Harvard Medical School, Harvard Medical School Researchers Map Prevalence or 
Gambling Disorders in North America (Dec. 4, 1997) [hereiDaft.er Harvard Divil:lion on 
Addiclionl:l Press Release]. From 0.84 percent in 1993 "the prevalence rate for 1994-1997 
grew to 1.29 pereent of the adult population." Id. 
57. Compare Harvard Addlctions Meta-analyl:lis, supra note 56, app. II (not reporting 
the numbers and percentages of pathological and problem gamblers in the 150-172 studies 
analyzed), with Economic Impacts, supra note 52, at 89, tbl. II (reporting the numbers and 
percentages of pathological and problem gIlIIlblers in the studies analyzed). 
08. Gamblill8 on the Futurf!, THE EcONOMIST, June 26, 1999, at 27-28. 
59. Id. 
60. See Richard C. Leone, TIu? False Promise ofCtninos, N.Y. TlMES,June 25, 2001, at 
A21; seealso JENNIFER BoRR£U-, GAM8UNG IMPAct' LITERAnJRE REVIEW 1 (October 20(3). 
61. For analyses involving feeder markets, see John W. Kindt, DiminiBhingor Negating 
tM Muitipli<!r Effect; TM 'rran$fu of COI'I8umer Dollars ro lAgaliud Gambling; Should 
A Negatiue Socio·Economic ·Crime Multiplier· Be Included in Gambling C08t l &nefit 
Analyses?, 2003 MICH. ST. D.C.L. REV. 281, app. (2002) [hereinafter Grime Multiplier]. 
62. Press Release, Osage Tribe Economic impact or casino on surrounding 50 mile 
region, available 01 www.osagetribe.com(July 12, 2001) (net negative cash flow on 5O-mile 
feeder market around casino equals between $40.25 million and $51 million); see, e.g., Bill 
introduced Allowing ·Reul Time- Allanlic City Gambling Oilier Internet, Bosro:-< GLOBE, 
Nov. 8, 2001 (·~f]ore New York casinOlJ will inevitably euL into Atlantic City's 'feeder 
markets' in northern New Jersey and New York City.-). 
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Critics highlight that the gambling industry's use of the terminology 
"feeder market" itself reveals the true nature of the socioeconomic 
impacts of gambling activity.S3 The 3S-mile feeder market often 
conforms roughly to the size of a U.S. county; therefore, an individua1 
cOlmty's statistics are often the starting point for statistical analysis 
(although "cross-county" 35-mile feeder markets must be analyzed and 
adjusted for impact variables).64 While utilizing the 35-mile and 
IOD-mile feeder markets for supplying gamblers to the gambling activity, 
studies financed by the gambling industry often focused their cost to 
benefit analyses on just the I-mile or 2-mile radius around the gambling 
activity- which prompted the summary complaint by U.S. Commissioner 
Leone. 
A related criticism of industry-financed studies is that the analyses 
are often focused on "preselected positives.,,65 If the industry can limit 
the focus of researchers to known positives or preselected areas or 
preselected timeframes, the research can be perfectly valid within those 
preselected positive constraints. 
In 1995 and 1996, the American Gaming Association lobbying group 
financed two so-called studies by Arthur Andersen to justifY the 
economic benefits of legalized gambling. These oft-cited studies were 
titled the Economic Impacts of Casino Gaming in the United States: 
Macro Study <AGAIAndersen Macro Studyr and Economic Impacts of 
Casino Gaming in the United States: Micro Study <AGAIAndersen Micro 
Study).67 The AGAIAndersen Macro Study found its way into the 
citations of the Final Report68 of the NGISC, but the Macro Study 
(along with the Micro Study) highlighted the problems of industry-
financed studies: (1) relatively few citations (to allow checks by outside 
reviewers);69 (2) a limited (or even invalid) scope for review;70 (3) the 
63. ld. ; Harrah's Entertainment, Inc., Harrah's Survey of Casino Entertainment (1996); 
see generally BEAR STEARNS & Co., N. AM. GAMING ALMANAC (July 2001) [hereinafl.er 2001 
BEAR STEARNS ALMANAC). 
64. See generally 2001 BEAR STEARNS ALMANAC, supra note 63. 
65. For a discussion and listing of some well-known industry reporU;, see EcolWmic 
lmpo,cts, supra note 52, at 51-56 nn.3-43. 
66. Arthur Andersen, Economic Impacts of Casino Gaming in the United States: Macro 
Study (Dec. 1996) (prepared for the Am. Gaming Ass'n, Lobbying Group) [hereinafter Am. 
Gaming Ass'nlAndersen Macro Study]. 
67. Arthur Andersen, Economic Impacts of Casillo Gaming in the United States: Micro 
Study (May 1997) (prepared for the Am. Gaming Ass'n, Lobbying Group) [hereinafter Am. 
Gaming Ass'niAndersen Micro Study!. 
68. NAT'L GA1>IBUNG IMPACT STUDY CO"M"M'N, FINAL REPORT (June 1999) [hereillafter 
NGISC FINAL REPORT]; see also NAr'L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COM~I'N, EXECUTIVE 
SUMMARY (June 1999) [hereimd'ter NGISC EXJ,:C. SUMMARY]. 
69. See Am. Gaming Ass'n/Andersen Macro St.udy. supra note 66 (only 49 footnotes). 
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appearance of pre-selected positives-geographic area and time-
frames;71 and (4) little or no analysis involving socioeconomic costs in 
the acknowledged "feeder markets.'>72 
Another well-known example is the Deloitte and Touche 1992 study 
supporting a casino complex for downtown Chicago and financed by 
progambling interests.73 This 300-page study made virtually no 
acknowledgement of any socioeconomic costs in the feeder markets.7• 
Similar criticisms of industry-generated studies were summarized by the 
University of Massachusetts researchers in the classic 1994 report,'6 
funded in part by the Ford Foundation, which analyzed and compared 
several industry-generated reports with academic reports.7~ 
C. Suicides Due to Pathological Gambling: Can a Wrongful Death 
Action Alone Suruiue Dismissal? 
An increasing number of suicides can be directly linked to pathological 
gambling.71 Allegedly blinded by gambling advertisement revenues, no 
Illinois newspapers covered the increased numbers of gambling-related 
suicides in Will County, Illinois until the L.A. Times'8 made the 
suicides front page news.N Joliet, Illinois, was the host community for 
the two casinos mentioned in the national press story, but in sworn 
testimony before the 1999 U.S. Gambling Commission, the city's legal 
representative, while extolling the virtues of CBsino gambling, stated 
that he was unfamiliar with the negatives revealed in the L.A TImes 
slory.80 Suspicious about the cause of a retired couple's double suicide, 
as well as several other area suicides, the Will County coroner was 
70. See Am. Gaming Als'nlAnden;en Micro Study, supra note 67 (only three 
communities anal~edJ. 
71. Id. (only relatively new markets analyzed over relatively few years). 
72. See Am. Gaming Ass'n/Andersen Macro Study, supra note 66; Am. G8ming 
Al;8'nlAndel15en Micro Study, supra note 67; I1ee also supra noteB 61-64 and accompanying 
text. 
73. Chicago Gaming Comm'n, Economic and Other Impacts of a Proposed Gaming, 
Entertainment and Hotel Facility (May 19, 1992) (Deloitt.e & Touche, Chicago, ILl 
[hereinafter PropOlIed GamingJ. 
74. Id. 
75. See generally CEO REPORT, supra note 5l. 
76. Id. at 68-87. 
77. St.:!phen Braun. Liue, Loslln (l River of Debt, L.A. 'nMES, June 22,1997, atAl, 
A14-15 (hereinaft.er Lil1f!lI !.o8t]. 
78. ld. 
79. ld. 
80. Corporation Counsel for the City of Joliet, illinois, Testimony before the National 
Gambling Impact Study Commission 0.1ay 20, 1998); contra. David Elsner, Joli~t 
Merdumts Fail to Cash in. on Gambling, CHI. !RIB., Mar. 22, 1994, Metro Sec., at 1. 
2004] GAMBLING LAWSUITS 541 
forced to issue coroner's subpoenas to two casinos.Bl After more 
subpoenas were issued for gambling records, the subpoenaed information 
demonstrated that several recent suicide victims had experienced 
significant or total asset losses due to legalized gambling activities.82 
With hundreds to thousands of surveillance cameras in each casino 
watching virtually every chip and slot machine, the duty to monitor 
pathological and problem gamblers would seem to be a natural 
obligation of the premises and could become a recognized legal duty by 
the early twenty-first century~regardles8 of whether the pathological or 
problem gambler had alerted any specific gambling facility. As the 
twenty-first century dawned, however, notice given to the gambling 
facility regarding the pathological or problem gambler was a significant 
addition to any plaintiff's case. 
Mrs. Debra Kimbrow filed a $50 million lawsuit in 1994 against 
Splash Casino based in Tunica, Mississippi, claiming that her husband 
Eric Kimbrow's pathological "gambling problem was so bad that he killed 
himselr>83 and that the casino "company exploited Kimbrow's weak-
ness.»84 "Kimbrow, 43, shot himself in the chest after running up 
$100,000 in debt with Splash. In the Memphis lawsuit, his wife said the 
casino let her husband-known there as a problem gambler---cash his 
personal checks even after he bounced some . ..s~ 
81. uves Lost, supra note 77, at AU-15. 
82. fd. Professor David P. Phillips published a 1997 report, Ekvated Suieick Levels 
Associated with Legalized Gambling, which revealed that suicide rates in communities and 
cities with legalized gambling were two to four times higher than in nongambling venues 
with comparable populations. David P. Phillips, Ward R. Welty & Marisa Smith,Eleooted 
Suicide LelJels Associated with ugalized Gambli118, 27 SUICIDE & LIFE-THREATENtNG 
BEHAV. 373 (1997); ~e Sandra Blakeslee, Suicide Rate is Higher in 3 Gambling Cities, N.Y. 
TiMES, Dec. 16, 1997, at AI0. 
In Ottawa, Canada, during 2003 it was reported that ~statisticg indieate[dJ 126 gambling 
addicts have killed themselves since 1999, an alanning increase from 27 such suicides 
recorded in the five years before that, ~ and Canadian experts attributed this increase to 
the video lottery terminals in bars (whlch were legalized in 1994). Gambling·Related 
Suicides Soar, LAs VEGAS SUN, Oct. 3, 2003. Additionally, a 2003 "investigation by The 
Canadian Press found more than 10 percent of suicides in Alberta and more than six 
percent in Nova Scotia were linked to gambling in 2001,n which prompted Canadian 
officials "to standardize the collection of lCanadianl suicide data related to gambling." 
Louise Elliott, Fonner Copps Coliseum Exec to SlU! Onrorio, Aug. 19, 2003, auailabu at 
http://cnews.canoe.calCNEWs/Canadal2003l0Bl19/J64161-cp.html. 
For examples of how U.S. stories linking legalized gambling to increased suicides have 
been supressed, see Lives Lost, supra note 77. 
83. Bloomberg Bus. News, Casinos May be Flush With Suits, CHI. TruR., Nov. 17, 1996, 
§ 5, at 4 [hereinafter Flush With Suitsl. 
84. ld. 
85. ld. 
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Plaintiff's attorney, Tom Brockman, modeled his cause of action on an 
extrapolation of the dram shop laws.86 Dram shop laws hold bars liable 
for drunk driving accidents ifbarlenders do not cut off drunk customers 
and facilitate their safe travel away from the bars. "In Kimbrow's case, 
just replace drinks with virtually unlimited credit, said [plaintitrs 
attorney] Brockman: 'Feeding Eric Kimbrow credit was the equivalent 
of feeding him alcohol.,,,,s7 Of course, casino defense attorneys dis-
agreed with such a legal extrapolation. In any event, by 1996 Splash 
Casino was bankrupt, and the Kimbrow case was "lost in the shuffie . ..s8 
D. Monetary Losses Due to «Pathologicar Gambling: Actual or 
Constructive "Self·Exclusion" Notice to the Gambling Facility via 
Patron "Cards" 
In a 2003 case in Evansville, Indiana, Williams u. Aztar Indiana 
Gaming Corp.,S9 Williams, who had never before gambled at a casino, 
visited the Aztar casino after receiving a free $20 coupon in January 
1996, approximately six months after the casino opened.oo Plaintiff's 
attorney, Terry Noffsinger, claimed that Williams lost the $20, went 
back the next day and lost $800, and eventually lost everything-which 
was about $175,000.91 AB they interfaced with defendant Casino Aztar, 
the claims in the Williams complaint relating to RICO provided a partial 
blueprint for similar cases:92 
a. Aztar constitutes an "enterprise" as that term is defined in the 
RICO statutes. 
b. Aztar has engaged in a "pattern of racketeering activity" by 
intentionally engaging in at least two acts of~racketeering activity" as 
defined by RICO. 
c. The acts of "racketeering activity" in which Aztar has engaged are 
acts of "mail fraud" as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1341.93 
d. Aztar has committed mail fraud by utilizing the United States 
Mail as part of a scheme or artifice to defraud Williams, or to obtain 
from him money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, 




89. Williams Y. Aztar Indiana. Gaming Corp., No. EV·OI-75-C·YIH (S.D. Ind. filed May 
7,2001). 
90. Noffsinger Presentation, supra note 47. 
91. [d. 
92. Third Amended Complaint for DllID.6ges at 7-8, Williams Y. Aztar Indiana Gaming 
Corp. (S.D. Illd. filed Jan. 4, 2002) (No. EV·OI -75-C-YIH) (hereinafter Williams Complaintl. 
93. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994). 
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e. Aztar has done so by, among other things, using the mail to 
assert that Attar, by and through ... or other identified representa-
tives or agents, would not. permit Williams to enter and gamble at the 
(clasino without first providing "medicaVpsychologica1 infonnation 
which demonstrate(d] that (his] patronage of [Aztar's) facility pose[d) 
no threat. to [Williams'] safety ... or well being{,r and on multiple 
occasions thereafter to issue promotional materials to Williams 
designed to lure him to the (elaaino for purposes of gambling, as shown 
in rhetorical paragraph 15 of this Complaint. 
f. Aztar has intentionally engaged in multiple incidents of such 
conduct with respect to Wiliiarns.H 
543 
Under federal ruco, the damages which could be claimed included: (1) 
an amount equal to three times his actual damages; (2) the costs of the 
action; and (3) reasonable attorney's fees. 96 Along with any parallel 
state RICO statute, as in the state of Indiana,Sl6 other damages would 
probably be recoverable. such as punitive damages.!l1 
III. CLARIFICATION OF GoALS 
A Actual or Implied "Self-Exclusion" Notice to Gambling Facilities: 
The Governmental-Societal Goals of Imposing Duties on Gambling 
Facilities 
Despite the decriminalization of casino gambling in Missouri in 1992 
and the reauthorization of slot machines in November 1994, it took until 
1996 for Missouri to create a self-exclusion program to keep pathological 
gamblers from casino facilities.9!I Arguendo, this delay in protective 
legislation per se indicated the progambling interests' impact on and 
dominance of the draftsmanship of the primary Missouri legislation. 
While it was obvious that self.-exclusion was a necessary option from 
experience in other long-term gambling states, the self-exclusion option 
was left out of the original Missouri legislation~as it was in all states 
decriminalizing casino gambling during the 1990s. To the credit of some 
Missouri legislators, the self-exclusion option was created in 1996 while 
most other states still ignored it. Thus, the existence and timing for 
enacting self-exclusion statutes became one barometer indicating the 
degree of influence of progambling lobbyists in individual states. For 
example. New Jersey. which was the second state t.o get casino gambling 
94. Williams Complaint, supra note 92. 
95. 18 U.S.C. If 1964(c) (2002). 
96. See IND. Com: ANN. § 35-45-&-2 (Michie 1998). 
97. IND. CODe ANN. § 34-24-2, 1-8 (Michie 1998) 
98. See St.lf-EzelU8ion., supra note 38, at 15. 
I 
'----' 
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in 1976, did not create a self-exclusion program until 2001, and it was 
the fifth state to do 50.99 
Under the Missouri Gaming Commission's self-exclusion program, 
pathological gamblers could voluntarily indicate that they wished to be 
banned pennanentiy from Missouri casinos. 1oo By 2000 the Missouri 
"List of Disassociated Persons" included "more than 3,500 names with 
about 90 people joining each month."IOI The head of the Missouri 
Gaming Commission indicated that each month, five to eight people were 
arrested for violating their bans. lin St. Charles attorney Joseph J. 
Porzenski noted that "while the program makes it clear that gamblers 
who violate the ban may not keep their winnings, there is no provision 
to return to them any money 105t.,,100 This provision was another 
indication of the legislative draftsmanship giving the casinos the "'win· 
win" policy of keeping everything---even when the casinos themselves 
had not kept banned pathological gamblers from gambling. Specifically. 
the sign-up procedure involved 
providing the applicant a copy of the applicable state regulation with 
instructions, a two-page verbal questionnaire administered by Gaming 
Commission staff, an application, a waiver/release form, and a power 
of attorney form for the release of the information to the casinos. The 
forms state that the applicant must be sober, understand the ban is for 
life and makes them ineligible to retain any winnings and may result 
in the denial of service at affiliates of the casino in other states. 104 
Since the self-exclusion forms acknowledge that Missouri casinos have 
affiliates in other states, the de facto reach crosses state lines and 
invokes issues of interstate commerce, the Commerce Clause,1M and 
long-arm statutes. 
Accordingly, the national trend would involve lawsuits against 
gambling facilities "'for failure to exclude gambling addicts."lot! "The 
theory is simple: Once a player puts a casino on notice that he or she 
is a pathological gambler-and asks to be banned from the casino, 
99. Diana Digges, Stakes Rise in ·Compulsive Gambling" Suits, LAWYERS WKLY. USA, 
Noy. 26, 2001. at 16 [hereinafter Stakes RiIJeJ. 
100. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 313.813 (West 2001). 




105. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
106. Self-Exclusion, supra note 38, at 15. 
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receiving promotional material or using check-cashing privileges~the 
casino can be held liable if it doesn't abide by the agreement."l07 
The existence or nonexistence of specific state regulations establishing 
a self-exclusion program, such as in Missouri, would not necessarily be 
determinative of the duty that the gambling facility has to keep 
pathological gamblers out of its facilities throughout the nation. At some 
point, courts will probably recognize a universal duty by all gambling 
facilities to ban all pathological and problem gamblers. For example, 
because 27 percent to 55 percent of all casino revenues come from just 
pathological gamblers/OS gambling interests will be financially moti-
vated to establish judicial precedents for a "duty" forcing casinos to allow 
pathological gamblers on their premises. Theoretically, the casinos could 
then argue that they are absolved from any responsibility toward 
pathological gamblers. 
However, in those states with a self-exclusion program, by 2000 it was 
becoming increasingly recognized that gambling facilities and 
the casinos have assumed a duty to keep the gamblers off the 
boats-and they breach that duty when a gambler slips in and loses 
thousands of dollars. "Even though they stress that it is the gambler's 
responsibility to stay off the boat, it looks like casinos may be creating 
some sort of duty to protect the gamblers from themselves, ~ said 
81. Charles attorney Joseph J. Porzenski.109 
B. Goals and Case Precedents 
The predicted trend toward imposing duties on gambling facilities was 
evidenced as the twentieth century ended. In 1999 several Louisiana 
casinos settled a lawsuit with pathological gambler Joe McNeely. 110 
The former Louisiana Tech football star lost his business and marriage 
over gambling debts. Although he did not register himself in Louisi-
ana's self-exclusion program, he did notify the casinos in writing that 
they should stop targeting him for business. The casinos not only 
failed to respect his wishes, McNeely claimed, but upped the ante by 
sending their executives to see him when he was at his most vulnera· 
ble--most notoriously, at his mother's funeral. m 
107. Slakes Rise, supra note 99, at 16. 
108. See Mego·Lawsu its, supra note 2, at 25, Table l. 
109. Sel(-ExdusiQn, supra nQte 38, at 15. 
110, 5fukes Rise, supra nQte 99, at 16. 
111. [d. 
546 MERCER LA W REVIEW [Vol. 55 
The 1999 settlement was confidential because the casinos did not want 
to r eveal the extent of their "deep pockets" or be viewed as "easy 
targets."U2 
A similar New Orleans "case testing self-exclusion principles"na 
resulted in another confidential settlement for an undisclosed amount 
during the Spring of 200 1. "A man had notified a casino of his addiction, 
asking not to be sent promotional 'freebies.' When the casino did so 
anyway. he fell back into gambling, incurred enormous debts and 
committed suicide.",U4 In this instance the suicide appeared to heJp 
determine the extent. of damages vis-a-vis a wrongful death action. 
Tn Williams v. Attar Indiana Gaming Corp" m the plaintiff's claimed 
facts were illustrat ive of similar case scenarios, 116 
Relevant Dates: 
1196 First visit to Casino Aztar. 
1/96 <Next day) Loses $800 on second visit to Aztar. 















First trip to Aztar using "Fun CB.l'd." 
Total Losses '" $72,186! 
Girlfriend places first phone calls to Aztar expressing concern 
over Willi ams's behavior. 
Girlfriend agai n talks with Aztar representative via telephone 
regarding her concerns about Williams's behavior. 
Girlfriend writes letter to Aztar asking it to ban Williams from 
the boat; sends information to document problem. 
Aztar sends its Cease Admission Letter to Williams. 
Ejection notice on Williams "submitted" internally within Aztar. 
Williams retUJ'ns to Aztar, after being banned. 
Aztar sends its December or January offer. -no one gives you 
more in December than Casino Aztar!ft 
Holiday Party High: Williams was one of Aztar's "very best 
players.-
June Newsletter Offer: "you are our most loyal guest,~ and 
"check out the Hot Slots 100 posted in the Fun Center to find out 
where the big payouts are." 
115. No. EVOl-75·C·YIH (S.D. Ind. filed May 7, 2001). 





GAMBLING LAWSUITS 547 
August Newsletter Offer: ~new machines are arriving all the 
time so youl1 have even more chances to win. And check out the 
Hot 100 Slots posted in the Fun Center and discover where the 
big payouts are. ~ ["'In a real slot machine. there's no skill 
involl)ed." -Deposition of Casim;J AztarJ 
Williams's last visit to Aztar 
Lawsuit filed. Ll1 
In Will iams Judge Learned Hand's test was paraphrased that "if the 
burden or cost to the defendant of providing precautions is less than the 
probability of harm times the seriousness of the harm, if it occurs, then 
the defendant [casino] violates its duty.,,1l8 
C. Mega-Lawsuits and the Legal Discovery of Marketing [nformation 
Directed at GamblinKs Market Segments: The Gambling Facilities' 
Interface with "Player Groups" 
In 1994 Florida residents William Poulos and Wi1liam Ahern filed 
separate lawsuits against approximately seventy defendants in the 
gambling industry, and in 1995 the United States District Court for the 
District of Nevada combined these cases as Poulos u. Caesars World, 
Inc. 1I9 Plaintiffs had lost large amounts of money playing slot ma-
chines, their successor electronic gambling machines (EGMs), and video 
gambling machines (VGMs) during the previous twenty years.12O 
Among other allegations. plaintiffs "claimed that the machines induced 
them to play by misrepresenting their actual odds of winning. ,,121 
117. Id. 
118. Williams Complaint, supra note 92. For similar cases, see Rick AIm, lAwsuits say 
Harrah's offered Improper Credit , KANSAS CITY STAR, May 31, 2002, at D1. 
U9. CV-S-94-1226 (U.S. Di!t. Ct. Nev. filed Jan. 8, 1998). See alw Poulos v. CaefiarE 
World, Inc., CV-S·94·1126-LDG (RJJ) (U.S. Dist. Ct. Nev.) (base file); Ahem v. Caesar!! 
World, Inc., CV·S-94-U37-LOO (RJJ) (U.S. Dist. Ct. Nev.) (base file). See gelU!rally 
Opinion of Chief U.S. Dist. Judge Lloyd D. George on Defendants' Motions to Dismiss, 
Poulos v. Caesars World, Inc., CV-S-94-1126-LOO (RJJ) (Nev. 1996) (requiring an amended 
complaint) (base file); Second Consolidated Amended Complaint and Jury Demand, Poulos 
v. Caesars World, Inc., Class Action, CV-S-94-1l26-DAE (RJJ) (D. Nev. 1998) (base me) 
{hereinafter Poulos Second Complaint1-
120. See Poulos Second Complaint, supra note 119. 
121. David Strow, Gamers Foce WUkr Fraud Lawsuit, LAs VEGAS SUN, June 22, 1999, 
at Cl [hereinaft.er Fraud Lawsuitl. Order to Dismiss for Laek of Personal Jurisdiction, 
Poulos v. Caesars World, Inc., CV-S-94-1126-DAE (RJJ) Dec. 19, 1997 (U.S. Dist. Ct. Nev.); 
Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Poulos v. 
CaesanJ World, CV-S-94-1126-DAE (R.JJ), Dec. 19, 1997 (U.S. Dist. Ct. Nev.); Order 
Denying Cruise Ship Defendant's Motion to DismiSE for Lack of Subject Mauer 
Jurisdiction, Poulos v. Caesan; World, Inc. , CV-S-94-1126-DAE (RJJ), Dee. 19, 1997 (U.s. 
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Plaintiffs also alleged a classic case of fraud, but in 1997 the Nevada 
district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to plead 
fraud with particularity; however, the court denied the motion to dismiss 
for failure to state a claim. 1Zl 
The many defendants induded land-based casino operators, slot and 
video gambling manufacturers, and cruise ship casinos. The press 
realized the importance of Poulos because plaintiffs were "suing virtually 
every major casino operator and slot manufacturer ... [and] asking a 
federal judge for access to documents ... [which allegedly] prove[d] a 
long-term effort was made by industry players to intentionally mislead 
slot players.,,123 While defendants' public relations (PR) representa· 
tives would have an obvious interest in limiting the public's knowledge 
of these potential issues, the Nevada press was outlining the relevant 
industry information that the legal discovery process could unearth . 
Such documents could include marketing materials, memos, presenta-
tion materials and slot operations manuals. The plaintiffs are also 
seeking access to casino player records, which they claim will show 
that the playing habits of the defendanlS are typical among slot 
players. The amount ofrecoros being sought is considerable; since they 
would have to demonstrate a widespread history of such marketing, the 
plaintiffs are demanding materials that go back a decade or more. l 2-< 
In addition, plaintiffs' requests for information in Poulos provided a 
blueprint for future discovery requests in other pending cases. 
What the plaintiffs are now seeking are any documents and materials 
that will show [thatl slots and video poker machines have always been 
marketed in a misleading way, and that slots players perceive the 
machines in the same manner as the defendants. One example would 
be a video poker machine that claims it deals from a 52··card deck, 
when in fact it deals from 10 preselected cards. Another would be a 
slot that repeatedly places winning symbols near the payline, giving 
Dist. Ct. Nev.); Order Denying Defendant's Motion for a Stay on Primary Jurisdiction and 
Abstention Grounds, Poulos v. Caesars World, Inc., CV.S.94.1126-DAE(RJJ), Dec. 19, 1997 
(U.S. Dist. Ct. NevJ; Order Denying Defendant Princess Hotel's Motion to Dismiss under 
The Act of State Doctrine, Poulos v. Caesars World. Inc., CV-S-94-1126-DAE (RJJ), Doc. 
19, 1997 (U.S. Dist. Ct. Nev.l; Order (motion for class certification -991), Poulos v. Caesars 
World, Inc., CV-8-94-U26-RLH (RJJ), June 28, 2002 <U.S. Dist. Ct. Nev.). 
122. See supra note 119; Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 9{b) for Failure to Plead Fraud with Particularity and 
Denying Defendants' Motion to DismiM Pursuant to Ru.le 12(b)(6) for Failure to State a 
Claim, Poulos v. Caesars World, Inc., CV-S-94-1126-DAE (RJJ), Dec. 19, 1997 (U.S. Dist. 
Ct. Nev.l (base file). 
123. Fraud Law8uit, su.pra note 121. 
124. [d. at CI·C2. 
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the player the impression of just missing a big jackpot. 1b achieve 
class action status, the plaintiffs ... [were] trying to prove such 
methods are pervasive among the dcfendantsYI! 
549 
Furthermore, while the discovery of information in the United States 
was important, plaintiffs' attorneys were well-advised to note that 
because most defendants were multinational corporations, there were 
opportunities to obtain relevant marketing information including public 
information and internal memos from the international facilities that 
were owned by the U.S.-based companies. 
IV. HiSTORICAL BACKGROll."D 
A. Are the Gambling Industry's Games Really "Fair"? Case Trends 
Challenging "Fairness"': Missouri ex ret. Small v. Ameristar Casino 
Kansas City, Inc. 126 
For all practical purposes, the "games," as "refined" by the gambling 
industry, have a built-in edge for "the House" with the inevitable result 
that over time the House will always win the entire amount of money 
wagcred- a principle known as "gambler's ruin."I27 Statistically, a 
gambler can therefore only come out ahead if there is a short-term 
positive cash "win"-and then the gambler never wagers again. l28 
However, sociologists point to the overwhelming significance of the first 
"win" or "apparent win" for the novice gambler, which serves to "hook" 
the new gambler into continued gambling. l 2:9 Basic statistics indicate 
that continued gambling can only lead to gambler's ruin. laG 
These scenarios raised the strategic and practical issues of fair-
ness-that is, were those jurisdictions promoting state-sponsored 
gambling really giving each of their citizens a fair chance of having the 
short-term positive cash win accompanied by a final exit from gambling? 
The gambler's ruin principle suggested that the policies of the states 
were not fair because they promoted and advertised "continued 
125. ld. at Cl. 
126. No. CVI03-319OCC (C.C. Mo. filed May 12, 2003). This case blueprints several 
causes of action in rhese iMue area.s. 
127. For statistical formulae demonstratlng the inevitable "gambler's ruin: see Michael 
Orkin & Richard Kakigi, What is tM Worth of Free CasillO Credit?, Alt. MATHEMATICAL 
MONTHLY, Jan. 1995, at 3 [hereinafter Frn: CreditJ. 
128. See id. 
129. See generally HENRY R. LESIEUR, nre CHAsE: CAREER OF A COMPULSIVE GAMBLER 
(1984) [hereinafter THE elIAS!). 
130. Free Credit, supra note 127. 
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gambling." The gambler's ruin principle delimited that over time each 
gambler would always lose. 
These problematic areas also raised specific issues regarding 
fairness-that is, were t.he states with state-sanctioned gambling really 
monitoring the fairness of individualized games, and were the states' 
regulators adequately trained? Were the states also deferring to 
determinations of fairness as formulated by the Nevada gambling 
interests or other interests with inherent conflicts of interest? 
In 1999, the 1996·1999 Commission suggested throughout its Final 
Report' 31 that locales and states with various government-sanctioned. 
gambling facilities had relied to their detriment and the detriment of 
their citizens, on the regulatory mechanisms and legislative advice of 
progambling lobbyists, 132 Therefore, early in t.he twenty-first century, 
individuals began chal lenging the state regulatory mechanisms via the 
judicial system. l33 
[n 2003 the leading-edge ca.se of Missouri ex rei. Sm411 v. Ameristar 
Casino Kansas City, Inc. 1$-4 prompted questions involving fairness and 
an allegedly defective video gambling machine (VGM).135 The lawsuit 
alleged that "the casino and the state commission knowingly anowed a 
defective slot machine to continue to operate."I36 The machine at issue 
was manufactured by International Game Technology (lGT).187 For 
the first time, a judge, as distinguished from a gambling agent, ordered 
an electronic gambling machine "pulled ofT the floor" of a casino, and 
attorney "Small also implied that the other 3,000 ... fcasino'sl machines 
... [were] at risk."I3B 
Also tenned collectively as "electronic gambling devices" (EGDs), these 
VGMs appeared to be particularly vulnerable to cha.llenges as in Small, 
because by the beginning of the twenty-first century, VGMs were 
providing from 50 percent (as an upper legal limit in Nevada only) to 90 
131. NGISC FINAL REPoRT, supra note 68, at ch. 3, 1-28. 
132. ld. 
13S. See, e.g., Writ of Mandamus & Writ of Prohibition for Product Liability, State ex 
ret Small v. Ameristar Casino Kansas City, Inc" CV103-S190CC (C.C. Mo. 2003) 
[hereinafter Small Rela1l)r Wri! of Mandamus]. 
134. No. CV103-319OCC (C.C. Mo. filed May 12. 2003). 
135. ld. 
lS6. Judge Orckrs Slot M(l.Chi~ Pulled from AmenSlar Casmo, KAKs.'tS CITY 
CIlAw.-.""EL..COM (May 12, 2(03), at http://www .thekarn;ascityc.hanJl(ll.oomln(~19878Vdeta· 
Il.html [berema1'ter Judge Orckrs Slot M(l.Chi~ Pulled]; see cmo Temporary Restraining 
Order, State (X reI. Small v. AmenSlar Casino Ran. City, Inc., No. CVI03·319OCC (C.C. 
Mo. 20(3). 
137. Judge Ordeni Slot Machine PuUed, supra note 136. 
138. /d. 
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percent of the revenues in most casinos (and 100 percent in many 
casinos), Furthermore, the VGMs were controlled by the gambling 
industry's various VGM "chips," and almost uniformly state laws 
mandated that VGMs "be based only on luck and chance, [although] 
many players [have a false] sense that skill makes a difference. '>139 
In the complaint in Small, numerous allegations were raised relating 
to specific issues of fairness as well as supposed improprielies,14(l 
Several allegations were directed to issues concerning the networking 
between the centralized computer systems, the VGMs, and the chips 
controlling the VGMs: 
One particular chip ... [allegedly] permits cheating and stealing 
t hrough t he entry of a sequence of player activated button pushes. 
When this ocrurs, the machine empties its hopper and consequently 
reflects that it has ~paid out" a higher number of coins thun actually 
has occurred. This chip hus existed in the thousands of ... [variousl 
slot machines at [various casinos] .... 101 
The allegations in the complaint in Small were backed by multiple 
citations to t he operational information accompanying the patents for 
chips formulated to perform specialized VGM functions. l42 Specifically. 
the complaint included allegations that: 
The slot machine as all ... [of the other variousl slot and video poker 
machines are networked th rough communication links to central 
computer processing equipment . . .. All game data is comm unicated 
between a gaming machine and the central computer. Pursuant to the 
[jackpot systeml. the gam ing machine requests and oontral 
computer periodically communicate packets of game/prize information 
to the slot machines. Ai; these packets of information a re depleted by 
wagering activity. additional packets of information are requested by 
t he machine and transmitted from the ... computer suite. The content 
of the packets are winlloss and jackpot prize instructions. Most if not 
potentially all of the stacks and sub stacks of packets con be preset by 
t he casi no to contain no winning progressive jackpot. Through this 
139. J. Taylor Buckley, TM Que!1 (Qr Gamhling's "HrJly Grail, "IndUIJtry Seeks Next· 
Generation Slot Machine, U.s.A TODAY, May 20,1996, atAI [hereinaft.er Gambling's "Holy 
GraW Slot AddiclWe Gamel (quoting Whittier Law Professor L Nelion Rose). 
140. See generaUy Small Refuw Writ of Mandamus, supra note 133. Attorney Small 
found language in the patents for the chip driving the electrOnic gamblmg machine!:! which 
was embe.rnlsaing and damaging to casinos and the developers of the chips. See, e.g, Berg, 
et (11, U.s. Patent No. 5,779,545 (iuued July 14, 1998). 
14 1. Small ReJaror Writ of Mandamus, supra note 133, at 6. 
142. SI!e, e.g., Berg, et ai., U.S. Patent No. 5,779,545 (issued July 14, 1998); Small 
Relator Writ of Mandamu s, supra note 133, at 6. 
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methodology the casino can assure that jackpots are not awarded for 
the indefinite future. l43 
Allegations involving the extent to which the VGMs could be controlled 
by the operators of the VGMs were also raised in the Small complaint. 
The complaint established the groundwork for expert testimony 
involving the degree of control exercised by VGM owners and operators. 
The parameters for the VGM issues to be reviewed in future cases were 
established by Small. 
The casino can also dispense a packet with a jackpot winning 
instruction to a particular machine to force II jackpot to be awarded to 
a particular player at a predetermined time. The casino can alS() take 
the slot machine in question ofT line to prevent it from receiving large 
prize award instructions .... MGC [Missouri Gaming Commissionl 
regulations require maintenance of all communications with gaming 
machines. Through this communications system, the casino can 
manage the timing a nd location of jackpots as well as to whom the 
jackpots are awarded and maximize its return (as well as progressive 
financial losses to players, some of which mayor can result in 
devastating damage including personal or finanda1 ruin). Through this 
system the casino can also systematica1ly win money from any given 
individual or plurality of players, most particularly those it has 
targeted [particularly via Customer Cards). The casino can also award 
jackpots or other prizes to selected players including potentially its 
confederate8.1~ 
Whi1e none of the allegations in Small were accepted by the court, this 
case highlights issue areas which could easily encourage future cases. 
In addition, the relator attorney, Stephen Bradley Small, claimed that 
several salient issues were not even addressed and that the judge's 
limited focus concentrated only "on testimony about one of several 
computer chips"l0&5 that drove the VGM. A summary of the court 
testimony supported Small's claims. l46 
The Missouri Gaming Commission earlier this year [2003] revoked the 
license for that chip after determining that a programming flaw could 
allow a player-in collusion with an accomplice with access to the 
chip-to cheat the machine by tricking it into playing excess amounts 
of jackpot coins. 
143. Small Relator Writ of Mandamus, supro note 133, at 9. 
144. Id. at 9-10. 
145. Rick AIm, Judge Puts Ameristar Slot Machine Back in Action, KAN. CITY STAR. 
May 16, 2003, a[ C2. 
146. ld. 
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Commission gaming enforcement manager Clarence Greeno testified 
that the programming flaw "had nothing w do with game outcomes," 
Small, however, argued ... in court that "this chip cheats players," and 
he insisted that it continues to do so because the commission has 
allowed the flawed chip to remain in that lone machine until its big 
jackpot is won.141 
553 
The court's myopic focus and refusal to consider most of the issues raised 
in the Small complaint appeared to frustrate plaintiff. The court also 
appeared reluctant to become enmeshed in issues involving the 
technological guidance systems for the VGMs. 
Greeno testified that the casino sought 11 waiver to continue using the 
chip in order not to create a public perception that its higjackpot game 
was being manipulated in any way. When Small attempted to cross-
examine Greeno, Mike Bradley, an assistant attorney general 
representing the commission, successfully objected and halted Greeno's 
testimony before it could become a matter of public record. l48 
The judge ruled that the specific VGM at issue could be placed back in 
the casino. 149 Although this case did not establish precedent per se, 
many arguments highlighted in the fifty-page Small complaint 
emphasized the vulnerability of casinos computer networks to future 
litigation, and the complaint serves as both a blueprint and a menu of 
future causes of action. 150 
B. Consequences of Gambling Facilities as Bars 
Since most gambling facilities not only serve alcohol, but also have a 
large monetary incentive to ply customers with free alcoholic drinks to 
keep them gambling, one cause of action would be predicated on dram 
shop principles of liability. Gambling facilities are very similar to 
bars.161 A front page Wall Street Journal article summarized the 
drunk driving and gambling issues for government action, as well as the 





150. Se€ generally Small Relator Writ of Mandamus, su.pra note 133. 
151. Jeffrey C. Hallam, Comment, Rolling the Dice: Shou.ld Intoxicated Gamblers 
Recover Their U:!sS€s?, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 240, 241 (1990) [hereinafter Intoxicated Gamblers 
Losses ); Joseph T. Hallinan, High Rollers: At Riverboat Casinos, the Free Drinks Come 
u:ith a Tragic Toll, WALL ST. J., at AI, A22 [hereinafter Casinos Free Dn·n.ks Tragic Toll]. 
152. Casino~ Fret! Drin.ks Tragic Toll, ~upra note 151, at Al; see also Patrick Graham, 
Casinos Fight DUl Bill Pushing Club Liability, NEV. APPEAL, June 6, 1995. 
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Since at least 1979, the academic community has known that "[aJ 
strong correlation exists between gambling and alcohol consumption. 
[with one study concluding] that gamblers consume alcohol on four times 
as many days per year as non-gamblers."I:;3 One academic report 
observed that it was "impossible to state whether gambling activities 
increase alcohol consumption or vice versa, but the relationship is 
strong.,,154 However, "the level of alcohol consumption rises as the 
amount a gambler wager s per year increases. "IM 
Despite these facts, gambl ing facilities typically pressure against 
restraints on the consumption of alcohol. In 1999 these scenarios were 
exemplified in Illinois when three casinos lobbied for (and all of the 
casino licensees apparently supported) an extension of the hours during 
which the casinos could serve alcohol-from twenty-two hours a day to 
twenty-four hours a day.l.56 In a hearing on October 26, 1999, before 
the Illinois Gaming Board in Chicago, the casinos were vilified as de 
facto "super-bars," and the time extension was opposed by representa-
tives of Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD), the National Coalition 
Against Legalized Gambling (NCALG, a charity like MADD), Illinois 
Church Action on Alcohol Problems (lLLCAAP, headed by Anita Bedell), 
and J-Journey (a charity headed by Jim and Barbara Esworthy). 157 
Having lost his daughters Jennifer (age twenty-two) and Jackie (age 
eighteen) to a drunk driver, Jim Esworthy detailed to the Illinois 
Gaming Board the negative consequences and additional drunk driving 
accidents that could be anticipated from extending the hours of operation 
for the casino super-bars. 1M The 1997 Esworthy tragedy prompted 
fl1inois to lower t he blood alcohol level required for proving drunk 
driving from .10 to .08, as well as to enact one of the strongest drunk 
driving statutes in the United States in 1998. 16~ Mr. Esworthy's 
153. Intoxicated Gamblers Losses, su.pra note 151, at 241 n.9 (ciling M. KAl..r.JCK, ET AL. 
A SURVEY OF AM.ERlCAN GAMBLING ATIITUDES AND BEHAVIOR 71, 73 (1979) [hereinafter 
AMERICAN GAMBLING BEHAVIOR». 
154. A..'dERlCAN GAMBLI"'G BEHAViOR, supra note 153, at 73, cited in Intoxicated 
Gamblers Losses, supra note 151, at 241 n.9. 
155. Intoxicated GamblersLosks, supra DClte 151, at 241;s« alS{)AMERICAN GAMBLING 
BEHAVIOR, supra note 153. at 73-74. 
156. See Jim Esworthy, Remarks to the Illinois Gaming Board (Oct. 26, 1999) 
(hereinafter Jim Esworthy Presentation Stopping Casinos' Alcohol Expansion Plan]; see 
aiS{) Jim Esworthy, D<>n't Permit 24·hour Casino Gambling, NEWS-GAZETl'E (Champaign, 
IL), Nov. 14, 1999, at B3. 
157. Jim Esworthy Prel5entation Stopping Casinos' Alcohol Expansion Plan, supra 
note 156. 
158. ld. 
159. See 625lLL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 5111-500 (West 2002), amended by PA 90-43, § 5 
(1997) and P.A. 90-779, § 5 (1999) (driving while intoxicated, transporting alcoholic liquor, 
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testimony, in particular, prompted the Board to reject the casinos' 
extension requests for the serving of alcohol. l60 
c. Gambling Losses Linked to Complimentary "Comped" Alcohol to 
the Loser 
Like a bar under dram shop auspices, the question arose whether a 
gambling facility had a duty to cut off drunk customers. If while driving 
away from the casino, the drunk customer injured someone or some-
thing, the casino would presumably be liable under dram shop legal 
principles. lsl If, while drunk at the casino, the drunk customer injures 
his company, his family, or himself by gambling irresponsibly, an 
extrapolation of dram shop principles would theoretically hold the casino 
liable for the amounts lost once the patron should have been cut 
off~and particularly if the casino continued to take advantage of the 
patron's inebriated condition by continuing to provide complimentary 
alcohol. "The casinos countered that drams hop liability is based on the 
proven effect drinking has on driving. If sober gamblers also lose 
regularly, the casinos said, it's impossible to attribute gambling losses 
to booze."162 On a tactical level, Law Professor I. Nelson Rose has 
predicted the trend toward mega-lawsuits against the gambling facilities 
themselves. 
"Casinos are in the same position today that bars were in 40 years 
ago-the big lawsuits are just waiting to bappen. No bar owner today 
would allow a drunk to be served alcohol, yet casino owners allow 
gamblers who are obviously out of control to continue to bet," said 
Rose.' 63 
In a 1989 case, GNOC Corp. v. Aboud/a-. Shmuel Aboud brought an 
action against a casino owned by Golden Nugget, Inc. as successor to 
Mirage Resorts, Inc., because he lost $250,000 while the casino's 
employees kept feeding him free alcohol although he was obviously 
already inebriated. 1M In denying summary judgment for the casino, 
and reckless driving); 625 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 5/11-501 (West 2002) (driving while under 
the influence of alcohol, other drug or drugs, intoxicating compound or compounds or any 
combination thereoO. 
160. Jim Esworthy Presentation Stopping Casinos' Alcohol Expansion Plan, supra 
not.e 156; see gen£rally Casirws Drop Request for 24·hour Gaming, NEWS·GAZE'ITE 
(Champaign, IL), Dec. 8, 1999, at B2. 
16 1. CasiMs Free Drinks Tragic Toll, supra note 151, at AI. 
162. Flush With Suits, supra. note 83. 
163. Stakes Rise, supra not.e 99, at 16. 
164. 715 F. Supp. 644 (D.N.J. 1989). 
165. [d. at 646. 
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a United States District Court in New Jersey held that the relevant 
point was "whether a gambler comprehends the consequences of 
continued protracted gambling',IM and that "a casino has a duty to 
refrain from knowingly permitting an invitee to gamble where that 
patron is obviously and visibly intoxicated .... "14:>7 The arguments 
went to the jury, hut thereafter, Aboud lost his case on appeal to the 
U.s. Third Circuit Court of Appeals in a close 2-1 decision. l68 
In the early 19905, Leonard Tose, owner of the Philadelphia Eagles 
football team, lost the team after losing $50 million in New Jersey 
casinos, including $3 million at the Sands Casino owned by Hollywood 
Casino Corp, lss Although Tose demonstrated that the casino employ-
ees supplied him with alcohol, Tose lost his series of actions, Thse v. 
Greate Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc. 170 in 1993, and Greate Bay Hotel & 
Casino v. Tose1 7 1 in 1994. 
In a subsequent and similar lawsuit, Hakimoglu v. Trump Taj Mahal 
Ass'n,172 Ayhan Hakirnoglu, chairman of the Aydin Corp., "sued the 
Trump Taj Mahal and Caesar's Atlantic City Hotel-Casino to block the 
collection of an $8 million debt, claiming the casino got him drunk."173 
Consolidating the claims in the complaint under a single theory of dram 
shop liability, Hakimoglu lost his case. 174 
It should be noted, however, that these cases were decided in venues 
where progambling interests have exercised protracted influence over 
common-law precedents impacting on gambling issues. These types of 
cases could be decided differently in those jurisdictions where gambling 
activities were more recently decriminalized. 
166. ld. at 655; su Flush With Suits, supra note 83. 
167. 715 F. Supp. at 655. For a subsequent precedent, see Miller v. Zoby, 595 A.2d 
1104 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991), r:ert. denied, 606 A.2d 366 (1991). 
168. Hakimoglu v. Trump Taj Mahal, Inc .. 70 F.3d 291 (3d Cir. 1995) cited to GNOC 
v. Aboud, 715 F. Supp. 644 (D.N.J. 1993) and Tose v. Greate Bay Hotel, 819 F. Supp. 1312 
(D.N.J. 1993) to Mpredict that the New Jersey Supreme Court would not permit recovery" 
of losses by an intox.icated gambler. 70 F.3d 291, 293-94. ThU; cursory four-page, 2-1 
opinion of the Third Circuit was followed by an insightful dissent by Judge Becker who 
concluded uthat the New Jersey Supreme Court would recognize a cause of action, in tort, 
allowing patrons to reco\'er gambling debts from casinos that serve them alcohol after they 
are visibly intoxicated." Id. at 294. 
169. Laurence Arnold, Tellingo($50M Losses, Ex.Eagles Owner Rocks Gambling Panel, 
'l'HE RECORO (N.J.l, July 1. 1999, at L7; see Flush With Suits. supra note 83. 
170. 819 F. Supp. 1312 (D.N.J. 1993). 
171. 34 F.3d 1227 (3d Cir. 1994). 
172. 876 F. Supp. 625 (D.N.J, 1994), affd, 70 F.3d 291 (3d Cir. 1995). 
173. Flush With Suits, supra note 83. 
174 . 70 F,3d at 304, See supra note 168 and accompanying tex.t. 
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With regard to the frequency of drunk driving accidents involving 
gambling facilities, forensic expert Fred Del Marva claimed he received 
an average of ODe call per day and summarized the alcohol problem.175 
"On a daily basis, someone will call me with this scenario: Someone 
goes into a casino, drinks, half an hour later, crosses over into the 
oncoming lane and kills someone," said Del Marva. ~Although nobody 
will ever do a study proving that alcohol is provided at no cost to lower 
people's inhibitions to make them game and bet differently, in my 
opinion, that's what happens. Free aloohol is served to lower inhibi-
tions and increase irrational thinking. I have videotapes of stings, 
where our investigators were served an enormous amount of alco-
hOp176 
Since the thousands of surveillance cameras and devices in casinos can 
track each chip, a fortiori they can count each customer's drinks- and 
cut the customer off. By the beginning of the twenty-first century, these 
types of alcohol-gambling cases were becoming more frequent. 
V. TRENDS AND CONDITIONING FACTORS 
A. Trends in Civil Lawsuits 
1. Sexual Harassment Cases 
One of the most famous sexual harassment cases resulted from 
incidents during a 1991 "Tailhook" Convention for military personnel at 
the Hilton Hotel and Casino complex in Las Vegas, Nevada. l71 Female 
officers were allegedly molested or harassed during the Convention. 
Former Navy Lieutenant Paula Coughlin sued the Las Vegas Hilton and 
was initially awarded $5.2 million.l7B The specifics of this case are 
beyond the scope of the present analysis. However, this case was famous 
for illustrating that in Nevada, the laws and legal principles governing 
the rest of the country might appear to apply, but de facto did not 
apply-an interpretation given by Nevada State Senator Bob Coffin. 179 
175. OwiM-Related Li!iBaliQn, supra ll(lte 42. 
176. [d. a t 24. 
177. Ed Vogel, &1UJte Approves Bill That Would Limit Hotel Liability, LAs VlWAS REV. 
J. , ,Tune 3, ] 995, at Al , A3. 
178. rd. 
179. See id. 
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In the Tailhook case, the hotel lost, but the Nevada Resort Association 
(NRA) was brazen enough to try to eliminate the $5.2 million judgment 
and similar future judgments by asking the Nevada legislature for 
special legisiation making the defendant hotel and gambling companies 
practically immune from the col1ection of the plaintiff's judgment.l8O 
According to Nevada State Senator Neal, who resisted pressure from his 
largest hotel client. to "vote right, .. l8l the 15-2 vote approving the bill 
"says to the people of the nation that we are not in control here, that any 
lime a large hotel has a problem (it can) come to the Legislature and we 
will fix it .... "lItl He concluded, "That is corruption."'83 
Generic concerns involving alcohol in gambling facilities also faced the 
gambling industry. For example: 
The prevalence of alcohol in the industry has also prompted a rise in 
sexual harassment cases, according to Joseph Kelly, an expert on 
gaming law and a defense attorney for casinos. "A casino orders a 
cocktail waitress to wear a skimpy outfit, a patron puts his hllDds 
where he shouldn't, and the waitress complains," said Kelly. "The pit 
boss says, too bad, the guy's a big player and to keep serving. These 
kinds of cases are on the riSC."E" 
In several casinos, the issue of sexual harassment has sm-faced in the 
form of lawsuits. In one 1998 case, seven women claimed that while at 
work they "endured inappropriate suggestions and touching."l85 The 
lawsuit sought class action status against three casino boats: The 
Empress Casino in Hammond, Indiana; the Trump Casino in Gary, 
Indiana; and Harrah's Casino in Joliet, Tllinois. Plaintiffs sought back 
pay and unspecified damages. 156 Carey Stein, the Chicago attorney 
representing the seven women, stated that the alleged sexual ''harass-
ment came from the employees' managers. ,,187 All seven women came 
separately to Stein with similar stories about harassment and how they 
all "took their complaints to management and were ignored ."l88 
180. Id. 
181. Id. at AI. 
182. Id. 
183. Id.; see Qloo Memorandum from Michelle L. Erb, Research Assistant Neyada 
Legislative Counsel Bureau (Aug. 2, 1995), nello'll attachments (on file with author). 
184. Casino-Related Litigation, supra note 42, at 24 (quoting J oseph Kelly). 
185. Former Dealers, Waitresses sIU:13 Flootillg CaliinOli for Sex HQrtJllllrtU!Tlt, RocKFORO 
REGISTER STAR (Rockford, IL), July 18, 1998, at A5. 
186. Id. 
187. Id. (quoting Carey Stein). 
188. Id. (qUQting Carey Stein). 
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In a different scenario, it was reported in 2001 to the New Jersey 
Attorney General's office that "men in the surveillance department at 
Caesars Atlantic City regularly focused cameras on the bodies of women 
in revealing clothing."I89 According to one source: 
Those images were then displayed on banks of surveillance monitors 
in full view of all employees of the surveillance department, to a chorus 
of "obscene language and sexually explicit comments, ~ the complaint 
said,leo 
Two female surveillance employees who complained about being 
forced to sit and watch "sexually explicit camera angles" were 
subsequently fired . . . [according to] O. Lisa Dabreu, the Director of 
the State Division on Civil Rights, who filed the complaint. lei 
These types of sexual harrassment lawsuits were expected to increase 
during the twenty~first century, as public knowledge of these scenarios 
increased and as government-sanctioned gambling opportunities also 
increased. 
2. Casino Discrimination Cases: Class Action Status 
A casino discrimination suit was granted class action status in 
1998.192 The case originated in September 1997 when several black 
former and current table-game employees for Station Casino in 
St. Charles, Missouri, alleged "that they were discriminated against in 
employment and advancement and subjected to unequal disciplinary 
actions."193 To qualify as a class action, plaintiffs had to identify ')nore 
than 25 such employees who allegedly suffered discrimination in 
discipline, promotions or terminations."llM However, before proceeding 
on the class action basis, this case necessitated a determination of 
whether the casino was "liable for discriminatory practices. "195 If the 
casino could be fOWld liable, the judge would decide whether the case 
could be certified as a class action suit. 11l6 Regardless of the eventual 
outcome in this case, it exemplified that similar class actions were 
feasible and that more such cases could be expected in the future. 
189. Complaint Cites Casino Surveillance Cameras, B£U.EVlU..E NEWS-D£MOCRAT 
{Belleville, ILl (reprinted from Philtuklphia Inquirer), Aug. 22, 2001, at AS. 
190. Id. 
191. [d. 
192. Fred Faust, Casino Bias Suit Granted Class-Action Status, ST. LOUIS POST 
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3. Discovery Issues Involving Casino Injuries 
The need for plaintiffs' attorneys to act quickly and utilize wide-
ranging discovery techniques was highlighted in 1997, when some 
required casino reports to federal authorities had multiple discrepancies. 
Due to apparent differences in the way many casinos report on-board 
injuries, the Coast Guard investigated several Illinois casinos in 
1997.197 Although required to be reported by the casino, by 1997 "the 
Coast Guard (still] had no record of 37 injuries that resulted in personal 
injury lawsuits against the ... [Casino Queen) filed in the St. Clair 
County courthouse since 1993. nl9B Furthermore, the "Coast Guard also 
had no record of the alleged injuries that led to 26 negligence lawsuits 
filed in the Madison County courthouse against the Alton Belle since 
1991."199 The Alton Belle had only reported seven other injuries to t.he 
Coast Guard.2°O With each violation of not informing the Coast Guard 
about an injury within five days, a fine of up to $25,000 could be 
imposed?H The casino representatives claimed that they were "in 
compliance with federal law and that their vessels ... [were] safe.»202 
The Coast Guard had the authority retroactively to fine the casinos for 
the violations,2oo but even $25,000 fines were essentialJy meaningless 
because the average casino took in customer losses of over $1 million per 
day.2004 
197. Mike Fitzgerald, Coast Guard to Query Casino Owners About Injuries, BEu.EVILLE 
NEws-DEMOCRAT (Belleville, ILl, Dec. 29, 1997, at 81 [hereinafter CCKU!t GlUJrd to Query 
Casino Owners); see also Mike Fitzgerald, An Riverboat Casin()3 Underreporting Serious 
Injuries that Occuran Board?, BELLEVlLLE NEws-DEMOCRAT (Belleville, ILl, Dec. 14, 1997, 
at Bl, 






204. See, e.g., ILLINOIS GAMING BOARD, MONTHLY RIVERBOAT CASINO R~:PORT (Jan. 
2002). See geruraUy John W. Kindt, The Failure to Regulate the Gambling IndWJtry 
Effectively; Incentives for Perpetual Non·Compliance, 27 S. ILL. U. L.J. 221 (2003) 
[hereinafter Gambling Industry Perpetual Non·Compliance]; Follow the Money, supra note 
10. 
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4. Second Hand Smoke Litigation: "Nowhere to Hide"ws 
In 2000 the Empress Casino in Hammond, Indiana was faced with a 
lawsuit which "could have wide-reaching implications for the way .. . 
casinos deal with the problem of secondhand smoke."206 The case 
involved casino employees seeking damages for "dangerous levels of 
smoke" at the casino riverboat in Hammond, which was operated by 
Joliet-based Horseshoe Gaming Corporation.Z07 
The current and former employees who were party to the suit claimed 
"that company policy prohibited them from requesting to work in a 
nonsmoking area.,,206 Furthermore, they claimed that "while the 
Empress had a ventilation system, it was not adequate to clear the boat 
of secondhand smoke."209 In addition to unspecified monetary damag-
es, the employees wanted "the company to improve the poor air quality 
in the casino.'>2l0 Because the casino was a riverboat, the employees 
used "the Jones Act,(211] a federal law regulating working conditions 
for seamen and railway employees,w,1I2 which allowed "seamen to seek 
damages for personal injuries from their employers. ,,213 
5. The Issue of Religious Discrimination 
Accompanying the spread of legalized gambling facilities during the 
1990s were concerns involving potential lawsuits predicated upon claims 
of religious discrimination.214 For example, Barbara Young was 
allegedly fired from the Quad·City Times newspaper in Illinois "for 
refusing on religious grounds to sell advertising to riverboat casinos and 
taverns."215 For three years, Young worked for the newspaper as a 
co-op advertising specialist.216 In August 1998 she was asked to 
205. Patricia Richardson, Suit Casts a HaUl Over Cazina Boats, CRAIN'S CHI. BUS., 
Dee. 4, 2000, at 4, 53 [hereinafter HaUl Over Ctuinal. 





211. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1982). For an analysis of liability issues under the Jones Act, see 
Richard McLaughlin, Flooling Casinos, Personal Injury and Death Claims, and Admiralty 
Jurisdiction, 64 MISS. L.J. 439 (l995). 
212. Haze Over Casillo, supra note 205. 
213. 46 U.S.C. § 688. 
214. Su William Petroski, Womall Objects to Ads, Is Fired, DI!:S MOINt:S REGISfER, 
Jan. 26, 1999, at MI. 
215. Id. 
216. rd. 
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assume more duties, which included "selling advertisements to churches 
and for the 'Gil' entertairunent page.,,217 The conflict came with the 
"'Go' entertainment page. which feature[d] ads for casinos and tav-
erns."~18 For religious reasons, she felt inclined not to promote gam-
bling and alcoholic beverages.2111 When Young gave a "'written state-
ment from her church pastor that further explained her religious 
convictions..:l!W to the newspaper, "Young's boss refused to accommodate 
her, claiming that Young supported the sale of alcoholic beverages by 
dining in restaurants. oml Represented by Davenport attorney Marlifa 
Greve, Young filed complaints with the Iowa Civil Rights Commission 
and the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.222 
6. Premises Liability: A Case that Sticks 
Premises liability covers a wide range of scenarios, and the high 
profile of gambling facilities combined with their poor social image may 
make them more vulnerable than other estabHshments to causes of 
action based on premises liability.UJ In one example in 1995, a 
security guard in the Silver Star Casino was rcrced to escort a patron 
"waddling like a duckn'l24 out of the casino because the gambler had 
gotten "stuck to a toilet seat that had been smeared with glue. ~u 
This situation resulted in the gambler being escorted out of the casino 
"with nothing more than a towel covering his predicament.'0226 This 
incident of humiliation and premises liability resulted in a 850,000 
lawsuit against Boyd Gaming Corporation filed on July 14, 1998.227 
Premises liability could become almost a pro forma cause of action in 
various cases involving casinos, including cases involving the losses 
incurred by a gambler.2211 






223. See, e.g., Gamb~r Sues After Toilet·Glue Incident, RocKFORD ROOi.STER STAR 





228. Su supra notes 40·42 and accompanying text. 
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B. The "Comprehensive Gambling Impact Statement" as the Sine Qua 
Non Socioeconomic Requirement of the "Environmental Impact State-
ment": The Trend in Cases 
1. Gambling Development Projects: The Essential "Comprehensive 
Gambling Impact Statement" CompoMnt to the "Environmental 
Impact Statement" or the "Environmental Assessment'" 
Economic development issues invariably interface with the environ-
ment, 5 0 the need for an environmental impact statement (EIS~ 
under the National Environmental Policy Act CNEPAJso becomes 
relevant when a proposed gambling facility is large enough to affect 
significantly the human environment. In fact the socioeconomic impacts 
of legalized gambling activities on their feeder markets (35-mile radius 
around typical casinos) are disproportionate and also affect interstate 
commerce. Compared to a nongambling development requiring the same 
dollar investment (such as a large shopping mall), gambling facilities 
have a significantly greater impact because they allegedly cater to and 
create an addicted. or potentially addicted, gambling market.281 A 
fortiori . proposed gambling facilities, particularly tribal facili ties, fall 
into t he category of a major federal action significantly affecting the 
quality of the human environment.23\! 
Too often during the 1990s, there was avoidance of meaningful EISs 
by federal agencies, such as the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA),233 
analyzing tribal gambling proposals and the U.s. Corps of Engineers 
(COE),234 analyzing riverboat gambling proposals. Regarding gambling 
proposals, these federal agencies commonly opted to issue a "finding of 
no significant impact" (FONSn235 pursuant to NEPA, which obviated 
the EIS requirements. Before issuing a FONSI or an EIS, the EPA 
required the filing of an "environmental assessment" (EA); a public 
document required to assist the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
in determining whether a full·scale EIS was necessary.us 
Furthermore, one recommendation contained in the Final Repor{i'J? 
of the 199&--1999 Commission concluded that a "comprehensive gambling 
229. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (2000); 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4 (2002). 
230. 42 U,S.C. §t 4321·32 (2000). 
231. See Mega·Lawswts, su.pm note 2, at 25, Table 1. 
232. Su 42 U,S.C. § 4332(2Xe) (2000); 40 C.F.R. § 1508.11 (2002). 
233, Often a fee-w.trustapplieation was im"olved under the Indian Reorgaruzation Act, 
25 U,S.C. §§ 461-463 (2000). 
234. &e mfra notes 261-63 and accompanying text. 
235. &e 40 C.F.R. § 1501.'1 (2002); see aJ$C 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27 (2002). 
236. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2000); 40 C.F.R. § 15OB.9{a) (2002). 
237. NOISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 68, at 3·19, recommendation 3.16. 
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impact statement" (eGIS) should be required before legalizing or 
authorizing any proposals to expand gamblingya Therefore, a compre-
hensive economic impact statement should necessarily be required before 
any tribal gambling activities are allowed, and any major gambling 
facilities that did not comply with this requirement have been and 
continue to be in violation of NEPA and other federal r estrictions since 
the inception of those gambling facilities. Tribal and nontribal gambling 
operations would definitely fall under a eGIS requirement. 
Specifically, the 1996-1999 Commission recommended that: 
jurisdictions considering the introduction of new forms of gambling or 
t he significant expansion of existing gambling operations should 
sponsor comprehensive gambling impact statements. Such analyses 
should be conducted by qualified independent research organizations 
and should encompass, in so fa r as possible, ihe economic, social, and 
regional effecis of the proposed action.239 
The very tenor of this pointed recommendation highlights the impor. 
tance the Commission attributed to it. Furthermore, the Commission 
unanimously recommended a moratorium on the expansion of any type 
of gambling anywhere in the United States.240 
238. Id. 
239. Jd. For the comparisons between expanded gambling and drug abuse, see 
Statement of Prof. John Warren Kindt, Vniv. of nl., to the National Gambling Impact 
Study Commission, '"'U .S. and International Concerns over the &octo-Economic Costs of 
Legalized Gambling: Greater than the Illegal Drug Problem?,~ Chicago, IL, May 21, 1998. 
These costs tables were subsequently published in Mega ·Lawsui18, supra note 2. 
For a summary of increased addicted gambling, particularly as the youth rates are twice 
as large in the adult population, see John W. Kindt & Thomas Asmar, College and Amateur 
Spons Gambling: Gambling Away Our Youth?, 8 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 221 (20(2). 
For analyses of the increased bankroptcies caused by the spread of gambling, see John W, 
Kindt & John K. Palchak, Legalized Gambling's Destabilization of U.S. Financial 
Institutions and the Banking Industry: Issues in Bankruptcy, Credit, and So<;iai Norm 
Production, 19 BANKR. DEV. J . 21 (2002). For analyses of the increased crime caused by 
the spread of gambling, see John W. Kindt, Increased CriTTU! and ugalizing Gambling 
Operoiions: The Impact on the Socio-EcoMmics of Business and Government, 30 CRIM. L. 
n ULL. 538 (1994) [hereinafter Increased Grime and Legolizing Gambling]. For analyses of 
the increased taxes caused by the spread of gambling, see John W. Kindt, Legalized 
Gambling Activities as Subsidized by Taxpayers, 48 ARK. L. REV. 889 (1995). For a 
strategic overview of gambling issues as they interface with E-Business, see John W. Kindt 
& Stephen W. Joy, Internet Gamblingand the Destabilization of Notional and InternotlOnal 
Economies: Time for a Comprehensive Bon on Gambling Over the World Wide Web, 80 
DENV, U. L. REV. 111 (2002). Several of these analyses, published before the 1999 U.S. 
National Commission completed its report are referenced in the Finol Report. NOISe 
FINAL REpORT, supra note 68, App. IV. 
240. Id. at introduction by Chair Kay C. James. See also Address by Richard C. Leone, 
former Commissioner, 1996-1999 National Gambling Impact Study Commission, to the 
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2. The U.S. Department of Interior, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, 
and Comprehensive Gambling Impact Statements: Gambling with the 
White Buffalo's Environment? 
Under the 1988 Indian Gambling Regulatory Act (lGRA),Ul the 
pursuit of expanded Native American gambling resulted in a plethora of 
cases during the 19905. Prodded by the enormous profits in Native 
American gambling and by visions of sovereign independence, numerous 
test cases were filed by tribal gambling interests to expand gambling. 
Perhaps unexpectedly, Native American gambling interests lost one 
test case in 2003, Lac Courte Dreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa 
Indians of Wisconsin v. United States. 242 This case began on May 11, 
2001, when Wisconsin Governor Scott McCallum filed a notice of 
nonconcurrence with the U.S. Secretary of the Interior's determination 
on February 20, 2001, that applicant Chippewa tribes could "conduct 
gaming on lands to be acquired in trust [i.e., after-acquired property] ... 
and [that the gaming] would not be detrimental to the surrounding 
community. »243 The tribe's gambling interests then filed suit challeng-
ing the IGRA requirement of "gubernatorial concurrence," claiming it 
was unconstitutional .2« 
An amicus curiae brief opposing the tribal claims and supporting the 
Wisconsin governor was filed by twenty-one states.245 While not 
specifically an issue in Chippewa, the detennination by the Secretary of 
the Interior that the gaming "would not be detrimental to the surround-
Annual Conference of the National Coalition Against Legalized Gambling, Baltimore, MD 
& Washington, DC, Sept. 25-26, 2003. The nine commissioners voted unanimously for a 
moratorium on the expansion of any type of gambling in the United States. Casino 
lobbyist!; were outraged by the vote, and they voiced ohjections to those commissionefs who 
worked fOf the gambling industry. John W. Kindt, U.S. Natiorw.l Security and the Strategic 
Economic Base: The Business! Economic Impacts oftheLegaiimtion of Gambling Activities, 
39 ST. LoUIS U. L.J. 567 (1995) (urging a moratorium on expanded gambling in 1995). 
241. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-21 (2000) [hereinafter IGRA]. The IGRA was ell[lcted to 
regulate tribal gambling after gambling interests won thei r test C[l5e and opened the door 
to widespre[ld tribal gambling. California v. Cabazon Band of Misaion Indians, 4$0 U.S. 
202 (1987). 
242. 259 F . Supp. 2d 783 (W.O. Wis. 20(3); see Opinion and Order, Chippewa v. 
Wisconsin, No. 02-C-0553-C (W.D. Wis. 2003) Ihereinafter Chippewa v. Wisconsin Opinion 
and Order]. 
243. Chippewa v. Wisconsin Opinion and Order, supra note 242, at 5-6; see aU;o IGM, 
25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(I)<Al (2000). 
244. Chippewa v. Wisconsin Opinion [lnd Order, supra note 242. 
245. See id. at 4. 
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ing communit~46 reveals the Interior Department's negligent disre-
gard, or even ignorance, of the basic socioeconomic principles of 
gambling: Gambling activities are almost invariably detrimental to the 
surrounding community (which gambling marketers designate the feeder 
market).247 Importantly, the Department of Interior apparently 
neither considered nor referenced the nationally authoritative and 
relevant study on precisely this issue: The Economic Impact of Native 
American Gaming in W18consin. 24S While the shadow issue of "econom-
ic detriment," and the perceived need for a eGIS, pervade the arguments 
in Chippewa,249 the case was decided primarily Oll the gubernatorial 
nonconcurrence provision, and the court held that it was constitutional 
despite the tribal arguments. MO 
In a similar case, the EA prepared in February 2002 for the proposed 
Huron Band-Potawatomi casino in Calhoun County, Michigan,2~1 did 
not even mention the significant academic literature relating to the 
socioeconomic cost to benefit ratio of 3:1 in the gambling facilities feeder 
markets.252 Therefore, the FONSI issued July 31, 2002, by the 
Department of Interior should not have been issued on both procedural 
246. Id. at 6 . Contra John W. Kindt, The Negative Impacts of Ugaliud Gambling on 
BusinesS<)s.4 U. MIAMI Bus. L.J. 93 (1994); John W. Kindt, L£galized Gambling Activities: 
The Issues Irwolving Marlut Saturation, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 271 (1995); John W. Kindt, 
Introducing Casirw-Style Gambling into Pre-existing Economies: A Summary of Impacts 
on Tourism, Restaurants, Hote/s, and Small Businesses, 10 N. ARlZ. U. H. RESEARCH & 
RESOURCE ern. 6 (1996). 
247. For a 5ummary of these issoes, see Kindt, Crime Multiplier, supra note 61. 
248. WILLIAM THOMPSON ET AL., THE EcONOMIC IMPACT OF NATIVE AMERICAN GAMING 
IN WISCONSIN (Wis. Policy Research Im;t. 1995) [hereinafU!r WIS. PoLICY REsEARCH INST.), 
249. See generally Chippewa v. Wisconsin Opinion and Order, supra note 242. at 3-6. 
250. Id. at 35. 
251. EDAW, Inc., Environmental Assessment: Nottawaseppi Huron Band of 
Potawatomi Indians: Calhoun County Gaming Facility (Feb. 2002). 
252. The National Impact of Casino Gambling Proliferation: Hearing before the HouS<) 
Comm. on Small Business. 103d Congo 77-81 & nn.9, 12 (1994); John W. Kindt, The 
Business-Economic Impacts of LicenSi!d Caiiino Gambling in West Virginia: Sheri· Term 
Gain but Long-Term Pain , 13 W. VA. U. PuB. AFF. REP. 22 (1996). For a sommary of 
studies, see Earl L. GrinOIE & David B. Mustard, Business ProfitabUity versus Social 
Profitability: Evaluating Industries with ExterMlities. The Case of Casinos, 22 
MANAGERIAL & DEC. ECON. 143, 153 (2001) [hereinafter The CaS<) ofCcuinosJ; see Earl L. 
Grinols, et at. Casinos and Crime (1999) (unpublished draft on file with author, fOrthcom ing 
as Earl L. Grinols & David B. Mustard, Th£ Curious Case of Casinos and CriIM, _ REV. 
ECON. & STAT. _ (2003); see also Earl L. Grinols & David B. Mustard, Management & 
Information Issues for Industries with Externalities: The Case of CasilW Gambling, 22 
MAN'AGERlAL & DEC. EcON. 1 (2001). For the definitive book in these issue areas, see EARL 
L. GRINOLS, GAMBUNG IN AMERICA: COSTS AND BEl'-<"EFITS (Cambridge Univ. Press 2(04). 
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and substantive grounds.2M Primarily focusing on other issues, the 
Citizens Exposing Truth About Casinos (CETAC), a Michigan nonprofit 
corporation, filed a lawsuit challenging the Department of Interior's 
decision-making processes.~!W However, the economic detriment issues 
and the perceived need for a eGIS still shadowed this case. 
In 2003 in TOMAC u. Norton2~~ the United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia finally overruled a BlA's environmental 
assessment and concomitant FONSl.w Importantly, the court ruled 
that "[t]here is a certain common sense appeal to TOMAC's argument 
that a 24-hour-a..day casino attracting 12,500 visitors per day to a 
community of 4,600 residents cannot help but have a significant impact 
on that community.>7257 The BIA was ordered to consider and analyze 
"secondary growth issues..u.s with the court not deciding "whether 
BIA's decisionmaking process was rational based on the conclusory 
statements in the record about the extensive growth-inducing effects of 
the casino.'tU9 The case was remanded to the BIA to substantiate its 
conclusions and analysis regarding the secondary (feeder market) growth 
issues for the proposed casino.2tiO 
3. The U.S. Corps of Engineers (COE) and Comprehensive 
Gambling Impact Statements: Missing the Boat? 
One proposed gambling riverboat in Harrison County, Indiana, 
exemplifies the COE interface with such proposals during the 1990s. 
Many of these proposed gambling projects had embarrassingly sparse 
EAs used to justify the issuance of related FONSrs exempting the 
projects from full-scale EIS requirements. The proposed gambling 
253. Neal A. McCaleb, Assistant Seuctary of Indian Affairs, U.S. Dep't Interior (July 
31, 2002) (Proposed Nottawuseppi Huron Band ofPotawatomi Indians Gaming FacUity In 
Emmetl Township, Michigan: Finding of No Significant Impact). 
254. Complaint, CETAC u. Norton, Nc. 1:02CF01754-TPJ <D.D.C. 2002). 
255. 240 F . Supp. 2d 45 <D.D.C. 2(03); see alJ{) Memorandum" Order, TOMAC u. 
No,.tOTl, No. 01·0398 (JR) CD.D.C. 2003) [hereinafter TOMAC v. Norton, Memorandum & 
Order]. 
256. TOMAC v. Norton, MemofUndulu & Order, supra note 255, at 15. 
257. Id. 
258. Id. at 16. 
259. Id. The court cited to two cales: Friends of the Earth, Inc. u. U.S. Army Corps 
of Engmur$, 109 F. Supp. 2d 30, 38 (D.D.C. 2000) (remanding for further analysis of 
propost.'CI casiDo projects where the record included conclusory statements but no actual 
analysis of impacts); Aloska u. Andrus, 580 F.2d 465 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (each case must be 
subject to a ~particuIBri7.ed analysis" considering the nature of the violatlons and any 
countervailing con15ideratiolll5 of the public interest), lmcatro ill part 0' moot, 489 U.S. 992 
(1978). 
260. TOMAC v. Norton, Memorandwn & Order, supra note 255, lit 15·16. 
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riverboat project for Bridgeport in Harrison County had a fairly lengthy 
EA 261 compared. with similar projects-although skeptics would argue 
that the more lengthy EA was due to well-organized public opposition to 
the project. In the Bridgeport proposal, the COE issued a FONSI, which 
was both procedurally and substantively remiss, because the FQNS! 
ignored the academic literature and studies Quantifying the 3:1 cost to 
benefit ratio262 in the gambling facilities' self-identified feeder mar-
kets.263 Critics also noted that progambling interests would necessari-
ly want to sidestep the 3:1 cost to benefit issues, because almost all 
gambling proposals would fail the cost to benefit test. 
C. Since 1994 All Federal Agency Decisions Which Haue Not 
Addressed Gambling's Socioeconomic Costs of $3 for Every $1 in 
Benefits Fail Procedurally: Any Decisions Which Have Not Addressed 
the 3:1 Ratio Fail on the Merits 
Even prior to 1994, the gambling industry's directly and indirectly 
sponsored studies revealed that the socioeconomic costs of new gambling 
facilities were $3 for every $1 in benefits in the feeder markets.264 
Despite being attacked by industry lobbyists, the academic studies, 
including the 1995 Wisconsin study,26.5 continued to cluster around the 
3:1 ratio throughout the 1990s, and the ratio was reconfirmed in 
2001- and 2003.267 Nevertheless, it appeared that there was not 
a single federal agency since the 19705 which had reviewed, considered, 
or analyzed the 3:1 ratio in EAs, FONSls, or EISs. Accordingly, since 
the 1970s all proposals for expanded gambling, which had federal agency 
involvement, should be reviewed for procedural failure as well as 
substantive failures (on their merits). 
D. Trends in the Political and Governmental Environnumts 
The fast-shuffie tactics often utilized by progambling interests and 
their noncompliance with state constitutional provisions were highlight-
261. Set U.S. Corps of Engineers, Environmental Assessment, Statement of Finmngs 
(Col. Harry L. Spear) 1998; Press ReleWie, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Corps of 
Engineers Issues Gaming Boot Permit (Feb. to, 1998) (on file with Corps of Engineers). 
262. The Case of Casinoo, supra note 252, at 153. 
263. See CrirM Multipl~r. supra note 61, app. See ,upra notes 61-64 and accompany-
ing tert. 
264. See supra noteli 61-64, 252 and accompanying text; see also Crime Multipl~r, 
supra note 61, app. 
265. WIS. POLICY RESEARCH iNST., supra note 248. 
266. The Case ofC(Uirws, supra note 252, at 153. 
267. See generally Earl L. Gnnols, Comment, MA."<AGERlAL & DEC. EcON. (2003) 
(forthC(lming). See ,upra note~ 61-64, 252, and accompanying text. 
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cd by the unconstitutional gambling legislation passed in New York 
concomitant to the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center.266 Even 
absent such a national tragedy as a public relations tool, progambling 
interests historically evidenced little respect for pre-existing legislative 
restraints and constitutional safeguards. These problems were 
illustrated in Indiana during a 1993 special session of the Indiana 
General Assembly, which was convened by Governor Evan Bayh (0) to 
pass the 1994-1995 biannual budget. AJ:, in previous sessions, proposals 
were initiated to authorize casino gambling on riverboats. A riverboat 
gambling bill had failed on its merits during the regular session, but 
during the special session it "was attached as an amendment to the 
budget bill during a conference committee.,,269 This logrolled bill 
passed both houses of the General Assembly. Although it was vetoed by 
Governor Bayh, the General Assembly repassed the budget bill, and it 
became law.27Q Thus, the gambling riverboat bill was codified via a 
procedural maneuver rather than a debate on its merits.271 
In 1998 lndiana citizens challenged the constitutionality of the 
riverboat gambling act, in Schulz, Phillips, & Becker v. Indiana.272 
However, because he had served as a former Indiana gambling regulator, 
one Indiana Supreme Court Justice had to recuse himself from the vote 
on the petition to transfer the case.273 A tie resulted, which had the 
practical effect of denying the majority needed to grant the petition to 
transfer,274 and thereby once again procedural issues exempted the 
gamb1ing riverboat legislation from a scrutiny of substantive issues. 
268. See John W. Kindt . Would Re·Criminalizing U.S. Gambling Pump· Prime the 
Economy and Could U.S. Gambling Facilities Be Transformed into Educational and High -
Tech Facilities?, 8 STANFORD J. L., Bus. & FIN. 169 (2003) [hereinafter Gambling Facilities 
Transformed intv Educational Facilities]; see also John W. Kindt & Anne E. C. Brynn, 
Destructi!!!.' ECQrwmic Policies in tlu! Age of Terrorism: GOr.JCrnment-Scmctioned Gambling 
as Encouraging Transboundary Ecorwmic Raiding and Destabilizing National and 
International Ecorwmies, 16 TEMPLE IN'r'L & COMPo L.J. 243 (2002); John W. Kindt, 
Internationally, TIu! 21st Century Is No Time {Qr the UnUed States to be Gambling With the 
Ecorwmy: Taxpayers Subsidizing the Gambling Indufltry and the De Far.:/{> Elimination of 
All Casino Tax !kr.JCnues via tlu! 2002 Ecorwmic Slimu/us Act, 29 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 363 
(2003). 
269. Amended Complaint, Schulz, Phillips, & Becker v.lndiana, No. 3ICOl-961O-CP--
214 (C.C. Ind. 1998) [hereinafter Schulz Complaint]. 
270. Id. 
271. IND. CODE ANN §§ 4-33-3-1 to 4-33-3-23 (Michie 1996). 
272. No. 31COl·961O-CP-214 (C.C. Ind. 1998); Schulz Complaint, supra note 269. 
273. Memorandum fl"Qm Indianapolis Attorney Richard A. Waples, to Pastor Webster 
Oglesby, el 0[., ~Re: Schulz v. Indiana Gaming Commission" (Dec. 12, 2000) (0 public 
memorandum). 
274. Id.; Order, Schulz v. State. No. 31AOl-9907-CV-240 (C.C. Ind. 2000). 
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During the 19908, South Carolina served as the most salient 
illustration of a state dominated and abused by progambling interests. 
In 1985 a gambling provision was slipped past gambling opponents into 
South Carolina legis)ation.m This legislative legerdemain had the net 
effect of inviting numerous VGMs into the state.276 Sacrificing his own 
political career as both the governor and a potential vice-presidential 
candidate with George W. Bush, South Carolina Governor David Beasley 
led the effort to recriminalize and ban these VGMs. and by 2000 the 
VGMs were de facto prohibited by state law.277 Multiple cases involv-
ing pathological (i,e. addicted) gamblers yielded multi-million-dolJar 
judgments against the elusive owners ofVGMs.278 
After South Carolina recriminalized VGMs, many of the machines 
were simply moved into other vulnerable states, such as Georgia and 
West Virginia, where the VGMs were operated illegally. According to 
progambling interests, the way to eliminate illegal gambling and illegal 
VGMs is to legalize what is illegal. In 2002 the Georgia legislature 
refused to be seduced by this legislative oxymoron and therefore, did not 
legalize the illegal VGMs.m This policy was followed by practically 
every other state. However, in West VIrginia the illegal VGMs were 
methodically and progressively legalized in specialized legislation, 
particularly in 2001 when Governor Bob Wise (0) engaged in political 
strong-arming.280 By 2003 West VIrginia had legalized 14,325 
VGMS.281 Apparently in violation of the West Virginia Constitution, 
the state's "take" or "piece of the action" from its VGMs was specifically 
designated for specialized legislative programs.'U!2 Citizens' groups, 
represented by Jackson County attorney Larry Harless, filed a lawsuit 
275. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 16-19-60 (Law. Co-op 1986)(the words "money or property- were 
struck from the statutory ban against distributions from go.mbling mo.chines via State 
Senator Jack Lindsay). For the most comprehensive antllysis of oourt cases related to 
pathological gambling's inurface with the political, social, and economic environments, see 
R. Randall Bridwell & Frank L. Quinn, From Mad Joy to Mi,fortune: The Me,.ge,. of Law 
al1d Politics ill the Wo,.ld of Gambling, 72 MIss. L.J. 565 (2002) [hereinafter The Merge,. 
of Law and Politics in Gamblil1,]. 
276. See South Carolina v. Blackmon. 403 S.E.2d 6&) (S.C. 1991). 
277. The Merge,. of U&w and Politics in Gambling, supra note 275, at 590-92. 
278. See generaU,. id. 
279. Rhonda Cook, U_S. Judse Halt. Use of Poke,. Machil1es. A'I'l.Al'<'"l'A J.-CONST., 
June 26, 2002, at B1; Bill Ronki & Rhonda Cook, Video Poke,. Loses &t 011 GeorgitJ High 
Court, ATlAvrA J.-CONST., May 29, 2002, at AI. 
280. W. Va. Governo,. Moue, Ahead wirh Video-Poke,. Straleg)', RoANOKE TIMEs 
(Roanoke, VA), May 9, 2001, at AS. 
281. Paul J. Nyden, Groups File Suit to Shut Down Video Gambling, CHARLESTON 
GAZETTE ('N. Va.), June 12, 2003, at A12 [hereinafter Suit tl) Shut Down Video Gamblingl. 
282. Id. 
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on June 11, 2003, alleging that the West Virginia lottery was not 
properly enforcing existing statutes and VGM regulations and that the 
VGMs were an "economic threat" to the state.2M As sllmmarized in 
19942@4 and then subsequently reconfirmed in studies throughout the 
following years,Wi the socioeconomic costs of new decriminalized 
gambling facilities clustered at costs of $3 for every $1 in benefits.28fI 
In venues with loss limits, like the $500 loss limit in place in Missouri 
in 2004, these socioeconomic negatives and concomitant crime were less. 
However, in states like minois with no loss limits the negatives were 
proportionally intensified-with increased costs passed to the taxpayers. 
In West Virginia, Lewisburg attorney Barry Bruce and the Treasurer of 
the Greenbrier COWlty Coalition Against Gambling Expansion Paula 
McLaughlin noted that those states with widespread gambling (and 
without loss limits), including Nevada,28'I had more budget problems 
than those states with less gambling.288 
The citizens' lawsuit was appealed directly to the West Virginia 
Supreme Court. The petition filed by attorney Larry Harless also 
alleged that the video poker machine payouts were "'rigged ... to ensure 
that over time, almost all players lose their money.' ,,289 With regard 
to marketing issues. the petition also alleged that the West Virginia 
lottery was «violating state law by engaging in illegal 'advertising and 
promotional activities to entice and induce persons to gamble, or gamble 
morc.'"m As these issues and parallel cases were becoming more 
public during the beginning of the twenty~first century, the legal 
283. lei. 
284. Set! supra note 252 and accompanying text. 
285. ld.. 
286. ld..; see aiI/O I/upra note 239 and nttompanying text. 
287. In 2003 Nevada's Governor Kenny Guinn ~tated in hi! ~State orthe State~ address 
that taxes from gambling sources were unrel iable and poor fi!cal policy. Nev. Gov. Kenny 
Guinn, State of the State Address (Jan. 20, 20(3). Ser olIO supra note 239 and 
accompanying text. 
288. Suit to Shut Down Video Gambling, supra note 281, at A12. &e. e., .. John W. 
Kindt, Time to Cut Better Deal with Casinos or Take Them Oller, CHI. SUN·TlMES, June 4, 
2003, atSl. 
289. Suit to Shut Down VitUo Gamblifl6, lIupra note 281, at A12. Compare id., with 
Free Credit, supra. note 127 (rormula for -gamblers ruin"). 
290. Suil to Shut Down Video Gambling, Bupra note 281, atA12. On October 17, 2003, 
the We!t. Virginia Supreme Court deferred to the political deeisions of the legi!lature and 
left in place West Virginia's VGMs. Slate ex reJ. City of Charleston v. W. Va. Eeon. Dev. 
Auth., 588 S.E.2d 655 (W. Va. 2003). JU6tice Stan:her'~ -lament instead of a dissent; 
exemplified the judiciary's dist.reu with the legislature'! decilionmaking but declined to 
declare it unconstitutional. Id. at 674 (Starcher, J ., concurring, but "lamenting"). 
= 
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discovery in these various cases was causing an increased ripple-effect 
throughout the general legal community. 
VI. POLICY ALTERNATIVES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. Recommendation for Uniformity: Federal Legislation Re-Esta-
bUshing "An Act for the Better Preventing of Excessive and Deceitful 
Gaming," The 1710 Statute of Annel!91 
1. Gambling's Losers as Queen Anne's Winners 
During the 19905, a number of casino players sued some casinos 
claiming "that gambling operators induced them to run up debts by 
plying them with drink or feeding their gambling fever with excessive 
credit . ..:m The gambling industry did not perceive much vulnerability, 
particularly since the major cases were in states like New Jersey and 
Nevada, where decades of industry influence had made the state 
common law favorable to the interests of the gambling industry. Many 
casinos viewed the lawsuits as a way for people not to accept responsibil-
ity for their actions or for themselves. However, some plaintiffs' 
attorneys began arguing the legal dram shop principles, which required 
"bartenders w cut off drunk patrons..m to support their arguments to 
hold casinos legally responsible for their patrons.294 With parallels to 
lawsuits involving alcohol and credit, "[i]n the end, casino credit 
practices may be the industry's legal Achilles' heel."295 If the courts 
were to begin to acknowledge "that credit extended to people who [are 
not] in control of themselves ... {did not constitute] a binding contract, 
then casinos will have to forgive inveterate losers some huge debts.>029fI 
and the casinos' responsibility for patrons would increase. Of course, the 
starting point for any gambling debts owed would be Queen Anne's 
Statute of 1710, also known as the Statute of Anne,297 a common-law 
principle holding that anyone who lost money gambling could sue the 
winner and receive his money back. Speaking volumes of legal and 
social policies is the official title of Queen Anne's Statute, "An Act for the 
Better Preventing of Excessive and Deceitful Gaming.-'>2!16 
291. Statute of Anne, 1710, 9 Ann. c. 14 § 1 (Eng.). 





297. Statute of Anne, 1710, 9 Ann. c. 14 § 1 (Eng.). 
298. leL 
2004] GAMBLING LAWSUITS 573 
The Statute of Anne was predicated upon the common knowledge that 
gambling activities can "hook" people, destroy their reasonable judgment, 
and make them vulnerable to being lured and entrapped into "Excessive 
and Deceitful Gaming." These 300·year-old principles of the common 
law were misinterpreted and misunderstood by the Seventh Circuit in 
Williams when the court merely dismissed the directed marketing to an 
addicted gambler as "puffery.-
For obvious reasons, progambling interests during the 19808 and 
thereafter made substantial efforts state-by-state to preempt state 
legislation modeled on Queen Anne's Statute so that progambling 
interests could directly or indirectly collect gambling debts and keep any 
monies lost at their gambling facilities. For example, in South Dakota, 
the third state (after Nevada and New Jersey) to allow non tribal casino 
gambling in 1988,900 the common law still allowed the gambling loser 
to recover all monies lost gambling"l' if the action was brought within 
six months.302 The electronic gambling devices (EGDs) for casino 
gambling in Deadwood, South Dakota, were made specifically exempt as 
'"'authorized gaming" from the principles established. by Queen Anne's 
Statute.303 Otherwise, within six months after the losses occurred, the 
losers could sue the casino's proprietors as well as any other players and 
receive their money back. 
By comparison, when casinos came to Missouri in 1991, the courts 
were easily accessible because '"'[a]ny person who shall lose any money 
or property at any game, gambling device or by any bet or wager 
whatever may recover the same by a civil action."SG4 This provision 
probably remained unused by Missouri gamblers due to the social stigma 
of being '"'a loser," as well as a lack of knowledge among the general 
public.305 In South Carolina, however, legalized VGMs between 1991 
and 2000306 resulted in multiple applications of Queen Anne's Statute 
and associated legal principles, which concluded with many gambling 
losers winning their cases. 
299. Williams v. Aztar Indiana Gaming Corp., 351 F.3d 294 (7th Cir. 2003). 
300. See Economic lmpacU;, supra note 52, at 70-74. 
301. See S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 21-6-1 (Michie 1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 42·78·47 
(Michie 1991); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 53·9-2 (Michie 1990). 
302. S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 21·6-1. 
303. S.D. CODIFIED LAwS § 42·78-55 (Michie 1991). 
304. MO. ANN. STAT. § 434.030 (West 1992). 
305. See, e.g., Casillo·Related Litigatioll, supra DOle 42, at 17. 
306. The South Carolina Supreme Court upheld the referendum banning video 
gambling machines as of July 1, 2000, in Joy time Distrib. & Amusement Co. u. State, 528 
S.E.2d 647 (S.C. 1999). 
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2. Extensions of Credit by Gambling Facilities: Nol Recoverable? 
If the gambling facility extends credit to gamblers, the credit losses 
might not be recoverable. For the few in the public educated about 
Queen Anne's Statute, they might find the statute applicable to t heir 
scenario. Otherwise the case of Anthony Lamonaco, a Walt Disney 
Company worker, could be illustrative::J07 
In January 1990, Lamonaco ... went on a two-day spre(! in Atlantic 
City and ran up 5285,000 in debt a t the Sands. Claridge and Bally's 
Park Place, owned by Bally Entertainment Corp. 
An averred compulsive [addicted] gambler, Lamonaco sued tbese 
casinos for the amount ofthe debt, saying they repeatedly extended his 
credit even though he was "totally out of control," cursing dealers and 
smashi ng ashtrays as his losses mounted.8O!I 
The New Jersey case went before a state judge who "ruled that the court 
couldn't recognize the disorder of compulsive h.e., pathological] 
gambling, in itself, as a defense against paying the debt . .0>308 With the 
added research available by 2002, the disorder of pathological gambling 
was more widely recognized. An example of this increased recognition 
was in the Final Report of the 1999 U.S. Gambling Commission.3HI 
Therefore , this defense would have more weight in the twenty·first 
cent.ury. Regardless oftms issue, the judge ruled that "there was a valid 
question as to whether Lamonaco was so distressed by his losses that he 
couldn't enter into a legally binding contract....all The casinos settled 
for an undisclosed amount-presumably to avoid the chance of setting 
precedents inimical to the gambling industry regarding alcohol 
consumpt.ion as a contractual defense to casinos' credit pract.ices.312 
In 1996 experts began to opine in t.he nat.ional press that the extension 
of credit by gambling facilities could be uncollectible: "If courts begin to 
agree that credit extended to people who rare not] in control of them· 
selves is not a binding contract, then casinos will have t.o forgive 
inveterate losers some huge debts.',313 Kansas City attorney Steve 
Small, who has litigated against casinos, summarized the issues as 
follows: 
307. Flwh With Suits, .upro note 83. 
308. Id. 
309. Id. 
310. NOISe FINAL REPORT, fJupra note 68, lit 4-1 et Kq.; ffl! NOISe EXEC. SUMMARY, 
supra note 68, at 16-18. 
311. Flush With Suits, supra note 83. 
312. Id. 
313. Id. 
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"Next is the negligence claim against the casino for allowing the 
compulsive [addicted] patron to continue to gamble. That is going to 
take some evidence, maybe a letter from a psychiatrist saying, 'Do not 
take any more checks from the client because he is an addict.' Where 
the casino bas good notice, they may have a duty of care similllI' to that 
in the dram shop cases," said Small. He said, "[T]hcre are defenses to 
gambling losses. Gambling is a contractual behavior and if you aN! 
drunk, you do not have the requisite mental status to make the wager 
enforceablet he said. "Or what about contracts void as against public 
policy? If gambling debts are not enforceable in Missouri and someone 
is advanced money by an ATM, is there a challenge to enforceability of 
these transactions?..s14 
575 
These issues b(l(:ome more convoluted when gambling's regulators 
recognize that extremely lucrative jobs are waiting for them in the 
gambling industry-often without a legislated one-year waiting period, 
8S was the case in Illinois before 2004.31~ More importantly, gamb-
314. !Xlf-Eulusion, 6upm note 38. 
315. !Xc Gambling Industry Perpetual Non·Compliaruce, sl.Ipm note 204; see also 
Increased Crime and Legalizing Gambling, supra note 239. In Ca.lifornia, for example. 
senior administrator!!; in the attorney general', Division of Gambling Control wereaceused 
by former employees of ~routinely quashfingJ investigations into suspected corrupdona, 
embezzlement and theft a t Indian casinos ... 'with the result being that millions of dollars 
of taxpayer money [was] bllSu.:ally -J.ooted" by oorrupdon in the easinos.'- Oneil R. Boto, 
Agent/J say Indian QuInO Probes Stymied. SAN DIEGO Ul',oN'TiUB, Oct. 10,2003, at Al 
[heremall.erIndlan Casino Probes Stym~d). Harlan GoocUon, the bea.d of the California 
Division of Gambling Control, relinquished his position and "","cnlla work f(lr a Las Vegu 
law firm. Skeptics highlighted this case as another example of the -revolving dooi" where 
regulators go to work for the gambhng l.Odustry. Id. (Goodson did not return callt; from 
the press). In 1996, Harold Monteau, the head of the U.S. National Indian Gami.ng 
Commission was forced out of his po~ltion for alleged improprietiell. He then took a job 
making money from those forme rly under hilS regulatory mandate. Bruee Orwall, Gamm8 
the Syrtem: Tht Ftdtrol Regulator of lllcUOIt Gambling is Aho Part AdVOCfJU, WALL ST. 
J., July 22, 1996, tit A9. For di.seus.r;ions of abnse$lscandab m these issue areas, see 
Gambling Facilities TraMformed into Educational Facllitin, Jupm note 268, at 172-76. 
By comparison, whon Philip C. Parenti the administrator of the JIlinois Gaming Board 
resigned to accept a pot;ition with Harrah', ca..sino company, 1I1inois Governor Rod 
Blagojevich summarily "tired- him-rather than permit Parenti to coiled several weeka 
sala.ry. Assoe. Prau, Gamillg Board May Change Co1lduc1 Crxh, NEWS-GAZETTE 
(Champaign, IL) July 19, 2003, at B4. For a dassic article on i5Sue&r'scandals involving tbe 
"revolving dooi" in the regulation of gtUllbling, see Brett Pulley, From Gambllfl6'J 
Regulators to Casil101' Men, N.Y. TlM&s, Oct. 28, 1998, at AI. To address the problem of 
the regulatory revolving door, the 1999 National Gambling Impact Study Commission 
suggested enacting law. providing for a ono·year delay before a gambling regulator could 
accept a position as tI gambling industry employee. This W8lI a common standard in other 
industries such as the defense industry. However, state. b8llically ignored this standard, 
and thereby gave a free pass to gambling companies. NGlSC FINAl REPORT, tlupra note 
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ling's regulators can be charged with not only regulating a state's 
gambling, but. also promoting that gambling-while supposedJy 
administering mandates to keep gambling facilities from admitting 
"disassociated persons," i.e .. pathological gamblers self·excludcd from 
those facilities. These types of legislated conflicts-of-interest demon-
strate the overbearing legislative power of prognmbling interests, 
operating to the detriment of the public good and common-law ethical 
safeguards. 
In one 2002-2003 oxymoronic example in Missouri, the legislation 
anowed the executive director of the Missouri Gaming Commission 
(MGC), Kevin P. Mullally, to sit also on the Board of the National 
Center for RepoDsibile Gaming (NCRGl.316 With multi-million-dollar 
backing, the NeRG was funded almost exclusively by progambling 
interests317 since it was created by the main Washington-based 
lobbying group for progambling interests, the American Gaming 
Association (AGA). Consequently, the credibility of the MGC itself was 
compromised. Furthermore, Mullally cou ld have opted not to accept 
such a high-profile position with the NCRG, and by accepting such a 
position, he significantly jeopardized bis credibility. 
68, rec. 3.17, at 3-19. 
The "revolving door" incident.s in Illinoiiil after the National Commission's 1999 Final 
Report exemplified the continuing regulatory problems throughout the United State~. 
After only a few weekll as an Illinois regulator beginning in 2001, 
Thomas F. Swoik quit his job at the llIinoisGaming Board [and] began 8. part-time 
job representing gambling interests as executive director of the nIinois Cuino 
Gaming Association. 
Swoik's career move has enraged gambling opponenu and government 
watchdogs, who want the Gaming Board to bar such moves. 
A.ssoc. Press, Foromero C«lIill.Q Regulator Gets New ,Job: Move to Gambling Associatum 
AnlJeN Opponents, Watchdogs, STAT€ J.-Rw. (Springfield, n.), Apr. 4, 2002, at AU 
[hereinafter CasillO lWguintor Moues to Gambling]. The fact thot Swoik went to the Illinois 
casino "all!lOciation .so quickly aftar leaving the Gaming Board raise[dJ suspicions about 
cozy relationships between caJlin08 and board staff.· Ill. Previously, there had been other 
incidents involving the lIlinois mrevolving door.-
Id. 
Swoik isn't the first person to leave the Gaming Board to work in the indust.cy. 
Its first adminiSt.rll.tor, attorney William Kunkle, has represented several casino 
groups, includiIli Emerald Casino Inc., which is fighting to open a casino in 
R06eDlon~. Former acting adminislnltor Joseph McQuaid is Emara1d's vice 
president. And Donna More, a former board legal counsel, is (I regular at board 
meetings, representing multiple casinos. 
316. Su, e.g., National Center for Resporu;ible Gaming, Annual Report 3 (2002). 
317. See id. at 4-5. 
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B. Recommendation for Scope: Federal Legislation Prohibiting 
Enforcement of Gambling Debts and Allowing Recovery of Losses Plus 
Gambling Debts Already Paid for Three Years 
The "Act for the Better Preventing of Excessive and Deceitful 
Gaming"318 (Queen Anne's Statute or Statute of Anne) specified that: 
(1) gambling debts were unenforceable by the courts;319 (2) losing 
gamblers could sue within three months to recover their Josses;320 and 
(3) if losing gamblers did not sue within three months, third parties, 
such as family or government officials, could sue for treble damages plus 
litigation costs.321 Therefore, it would seem advantageous for third 
parties, such as the family members of pathological and problem 
gamblers, to explore the possibilities of suing to receive three times the 
amoWlt of the losses. If"players cards" or "fun cards" were issued by the 
gambling facilities. then the gambler's losses could be more easily 
tracked, as they were in Williams tI. Aztar Indiana Gaming Corp.322 
This scenario theoretically means that the only practical defenses 
involved marketing to the loser to convince the gambler not to be 
dissat.isfied at losing and to keep the losses secret from family members 
until after the statute of limitations (SOL) of three to six months had 
run. As unreasonable and bizarre as this scenario might appear, the 
social stigma of "being a loser" appears to be so great,323 and the denial 
phase so intense in pathological and problem gamblers,324 t hat they 
necessarily destroy their own chances for recovery- both of losses and 
of self. The second major impediment to losing gamblers suing for their 
losses involved the ignorance of the gambler or t.he family members 
regarding the remedies available under Queen Anne's Statute. This lack 
of knowledge could be remedied by the gambler if the gambler or famBy 
members sought legal counsel, but as a practical consequence of the 
social stigma phenomenon, the gamblers and involved family would 
usually wait too long to seek legol advice. 
One solution was to extend the three to six month SOL provisions in 
most states to three years. Sociologists indicated that three years was 
318. Statue Dr Anne, 1710,9 Ann . c. 14 § J (Eng.). 
319. Id. 
320. Id. § 2. 
821. Td. 
822. Williams Complaint, supra note 92; I/>te Noffsinger Presentation, 8upra note 47. 
323. See, e.g., THE CHASE, supra note 129; Stalin Rise, supra note 99, a t 16. 
324. Id. 
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a reasonable time for pathological and problem gambling situations to 
manifest themselves. 32~ 
Finally the gaps in the state-by-state Statutes of Anne326 and the 
lack of uniformity called for federal intervention and legislation. This 
recommendation was reinforced by the interstate nature of the socioeco-
nomic impacts of pathological and problem gamblers. 
c. Recommendation for Clarity: The Judiciary Piercing the Veil of 
the Gambling Industry 
1. Avoiding the False Predicates of Gambling's PR 
During a 1995 U.S. congressional hearing, the false predicates and 
consequences of gambling's ubiquitous PRjuggernaut were summarized 
as follows: 
[L]egalized gambling interests are utilizing millions of dollars to 
misdirect the debate and cause government decisionmakers and the 
public to reach invalid conclusions. First, there is the incorrect 
assumption that legalized gambling activities are like other business 
activities. Instead, legalized gambling activities have large industry-
specific negatives, resulting in a cumulative negative economic impact. 
Second, the industry's tendency to focus attention on specialized factors 
provides a distorted view of the localized economic positives, while 
ignoring the large business-economic costs to different regions of the 
United States. Third, the extraordinary amount of money which is 
legally used to overwhelm any opposition leads to unbalanced decision-
making processes by elected officials, regulatory agencies, and even the 
CQurt system. 32'1 
In the decade since these congressional h earings,a28 the unbalanced 
decisionmaking of elected officials and regulatory agencies in decriminal-
izing organized gambling increased dramatically. However, particularly 
325. See, e.g., THE CHASE, supra note 129; ALCOHOL & DRUG ABUSE AmliN., Mo. DE?'1' 
HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE, TASK FORCE ON GAMBLING ADDICTiON IN MARYLA.l\"D (1990); 
see also DSM·IV, supra note 3, § 3 12.31, at 617·18. 
326. &e generally Joseph Kelly, Caught in the Intusection Betwun Public Policy and 
Practicality: A Survey of the Legal Treotnumt of Gambling·Related Obligations 111 the 
United Skltes , 5 CHAPMAI.'1 L. REv. 87 (2002). 
327. Nat'l Gambling Impact & Policy Comm'n. Act of 1995: Hearing on H.R. 497 before 
the Ho~ Comm.. on the Judiciary, 104th Congo 5 19-20 (1995) (emphasis added) (footnotes 
omitted) (statement of Professor John Warren Kindt) [hereinafter Congressional Gambling 
Hearing 1995]. 
328. Id.. 
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alarming was the increase in cursory reviews and invalid assumptions 
to be found in judicial decisions. 
Exemplifying these problems were tribal interests being leveraged by 
progamhling interests to file test cases that were designed to place 
gambling facilities in every locale.3:!II Among the nontribal cases, 
Pa.ppas exemplifies the problems faced by the judiciary. 
In 1993 the Las Vegas Downtown Redevelopment Agency, essentially 
the city council of Las Vegas,330 used eminent domain to take the 
Pappas's land allegedly "in less than 50 seconds in a summary proceed~ 
iog on December 15, 1993 at which they were not even presentn.\lI\ nor 
previously properly servc<f.332 
Finally, in December 2003, Pappas was appealed to the U.S. Supreme 
Court.w The pivotal issue in Pappas was "whether casinos and 
topless clubs will be considered 'public use' as defined by the Fifl.h 
Amendment,3:J.1 to the United States Constitution."33t'i As in Pou· 
los,336 which was filed in 1994, the 1993 Pappas case had been proce-
durally delayed for over ten years.3117 These problematic cases made 
gambling industry litigators vulnerable to claims of utilizing litigation 
patterns for delay. 
Pursuant to the Fifth Amendment, the power of eminent domain is 
curtailed. by the "takings clause" which provides: "nor shall private 
property be taken for public use without just compensation.»338 Prior 
329. F'or an analys is of problematic litigation being fronted by tribal mterests, see 
SubpoeruU"8 Disoollery Reveal HidtU1I Violatiol1!l, supra note 7, at part VIlE ("Gambling 
Intere!Sts all SavioNJ or ExplOiters of Native American Sovereignty?"). 
330. Respondents' Answering Brief at 3, City of Las Vegas Downtown Redevelopment 
Agency v. Pappu, 76 P.ad 1 (Nev. flIed Feb. 2, 2000) (No. 83812). 
331. [d. at 8. 
332. [d. at 7. &11 generally Craig Offman, Tire to Most Corrupt CilU!8 in Am.erica. 
GEORGE, Mar. 1998, at 90 (including !.nil VegM 9.5 one of the nation's most corrupt citi6l!). 
For advcrtisemcn1.6 attucking the casino interests of Steve Wynn. Bill Boyd, Jackie 
Gaughan. 61 well III Boc:ky, Ted, and Jack Binion as those interests interfaced with 
Pap[JlU, lICe Emirnmt Domain or Eminent Thievery, LAs VEGAS REV. J ., May 20, 2003, at 
B3; Eminent Domain Case Draws National Outrage, LAs VEGAS REV. J. , Apr. 1,2003. at 
B3. 
333. Letter from Harry Pappas to Tom Grey, Exec. Dir., Nat1 Coalition Against 
Legalized Gambling (Dec. 9, 20081 (detailing ~asons Pappos was appealed) (public letter 
on file WIth author) [hereinalWr Pappas SIllIlIllilIY). 
334. U.S. CONST. amend V. 
335. Pappa9 Summary, supra note 333 (emphasis in original). 
336. See supra note 119-25 and IIC(XImpanying ted_ 
337. See supra notes 3JO..33 and accompanying text. 
338. U.S. CONS'l'. amend. V. 
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to Pappas, "public use" included such facilities as roads, public buildings, 
and schools.3J9 
Harry Pappas summarized his family's frustration from the 1993 
inception of the case to an adverse 2003 decision by the Nevada Supreme 
Court:340 "It should be noted that enormous amounts of 'campaign 
donations' are given to Nevada Supreme Court justices from the casino 
industry.,,341 If the gambling industry were to win Pappas , the 
practical impact would be to allow "eminent domain to be used to seize 
small business, mom & pop businesses, homes and property for casinos 
and topless club expansions [and] would finally give casinos and topless 
clubs a constitutional standing that they have never enjoyed before.»342 
In league with virtually unlimited financial resources, progambling 
interests could use eminent domain to become de facto and de jure 
sovereigns. 
2. Dissecting the False Predicates of Gambling's PR 
a. Common Sense and Common Law: Duties by Gambling 
Facilities to Known Pathological Gamblers. As in the judicial 
trends of the 19508 and 1960s that dissected the false predicates of 
racism and catalyzed the U.s. Civil Rights Movement, the U.S. judiciary 
of the twenty-first century was posed with opportunities to expose the 
false predicates of the gambling industry's PR. Courts had three 
hundred years of common-law policies exemp1ified by the Statute of 
Anne343 to prevent "Excessive and Deceitful Gaming."su In this 
context, two leading-edge cases were Poulos"J~ and Williams.~6 
Because Poulos was still pending a decision on the granting of class 
action status in 2003, this discussion focuses on Williams and its judicial 
history. 
On March 5, 2003, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 
Indiana granted summary judgment in favor of defendant in Williams 
339. See Pappas Summary, supra note 333. 
340. City of Las Vegas Downtown Redevelopment Agency v. Pappas, 76 P.3d 1 (Nev. 
2003). 
341. Pappas Summary, supra note 333. 
342. ld. 
343. See supra notes 318·26 and accompanying text. 
344. ld. 
345. For a background discussion of Poulos, see supra notes 119-25 and accompanying 
text. 
346. For a background discussion of Williams, see supra notes 89-97 and 115-18 and 
accompanying text. 
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u. Aztar. 347 As precedent, the court cited to a recently decided 2003 
Seventh Circuit case, Merrill v. Trump Indiana, Inc./,48 in which a 
pathological gambler convicted of robbing banks (supposedly to feed his 
gambling habit) sued the Trump Indiana casinO.849 Although the facts 
and issues in Merrill could be distinguished from the pending Williams 
case, the district court issued summary judgment in favor of defendant 
Aztar.350 Williams was then appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals fOT 
the Seventh Circuit,351 before which appellant claimed: 
A. The Court Should Depart from Merrill and Hold, as the Indiana 
Supreme Court Would Under the Circumstances Present in this Case, 
that Indiana Law Recognizes a Duty of Reasonable Care on the Part 
of a Casino Thward a Known Pathological Gambler. 
S. In the Alternative, the Court Should Certify the Issue Presented in 
this Case to the Indiana Supreme Court for its Resolution of the 
Critical Question of Indiana State Law on Which Williams' Claims Are 
Based.352 
Appellee Aztar basically claimed that gambling facilities, specifically 
casinos, had no common-law duty to keep known pathological gamblers 
from destructive gambling at casinos and that no such duty should be 
created.363 
While the Williams appeal, filed May 19, 2003, was being prepared, 
the Indiana legislature was debating whether to codify a common-law 
duty for casinos to prohibit the destructive gambling of known pathologi-
cal gamblers (soon to be called "registered" or "self-excluded" gam-
blers).354 The Indiana legislation was prodded by the adverse decision 
in Williams by the district court.355 Indiana State Senator Larry E. 
Lutz (0), representing Casino Aztar's district, attempted to kill this 
347. Williams v. Azt.ar Ind. Gaming Corp., No. EV-Ol-75-C-TH, 2003 WL 1903369. at 
·7-8 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 5, 2003). 
348. 320 F.3d 729 (7th Cir. 2003). 
349. ld. 
350. 2003 WL H103369, at *7-8. 
351. Brief of Appellant, Williams v. Aztar Ind. Gaming Corp. (7th Cir. filed May 19, 
2003) (No. 03-1822) {hereinafter WillillIllS Appellant Brief]. 
352. ld at i. 
353. Brief of Appellee, Williams v. Aztar Ind. Gaming Corp. (7th Cir. filed June 18, 
2003) (No. 03-1822) [hereinafter Aztar Appellee Brief]. 
354. See Conference Committee Report, Engrossed H.B. 1740, 1st Sess., § 4, ch. 16, at 
3-4 (2003) (codified as amended at IND, CODE §§ 4-22-2, 4-33-4) [hereinafWr Conf. Comm. 
Rep. in Support of Duty to Pathological Gamblers): Pub. L. No. 143-2003, § 2 (effective date 
July 1, 2003). 
355, See Conf. Comm. IU!p. in Support of Duty to Pathological Gamblers, supm note 
SM. 
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legislation via procedural maneuvers, or alternatively to grant de jure 
immunity to casino-style facilities for most torts.368 
The legislature ultimately recognized and rejected Senator Lutz's 
attempts to add tort immunity provisions for casinos.U7 Instead, the 
legislature added responsibilities, and arguably a duty.3~~ to casino-
style gambling facilities to identify and exclude known pathological gam-
blers,U9 Losing the legislative struggle, the gambling lobbyists 
succeeded, however, in maneuvering the drafting of precise regulations 
to the purview of the Indiana Gaming Commission, where the lobbyists 
had more influence to transfer more color of duLy away from the 
gambling facilities and impose the initial presumption of duty on the 
pathological (addicted) gamblers.360 
Under the shadow of the district court's summary judgment in 
Williams on March 5, 2003,:161 and concurrent with the drafting and 
filing of the Williams appeal to the Seventh Circuit on May 19, 
2oo3,S62 the Indiana legislature enacted legislation (to go into effect 
July I , 2(03) that was beneficial to the Williams appeaI.36.'I This 
enacted legislation was obviously designed not only to assist the 
Williams scenario, but also to prevent or reduce similar future scenarios 
involving pathological gamblers.U. 
Despite these legislative enactments and the policy impetus prodding 
the Indiana legislature, a less than cursory review of these developments 
and the duty issues in the Williams appeal were raised by the Seventh 
Circuit during oral arguments.3& Instead, the court focused on RICO 
issues, which were subsequently reflected in the court's decision.3M 
Accordingly. the RICO issues raised by the court extended the discus-
sion. 
When rendering its decision in Wrlliams, the Seventh Circuit 
expanded the RICO issues to a national scope.S6'I In Poulos u. Caesars 
356. Compare id. with IND. CODE § 4-33-4-7 (2003). 
357. IND. CODE § 4-33·4-7. 
358. ld. 
359. ld. §§ 4-33·4·7(a)(l), (b). 
360. IcL § 4·33-4-7(a)(1) (·program established under the rul ~s of the commission~). 
361. 2003 WL 1903369, at ·7·8. 
362. See Williams Appellant Brief, supra note 351. 
363. See supra note 354·60 and accompanying text. 
364. IcL 
365. Oral Arguments, William' v. Aztar Ind. GamingCorp .• U.S. Seventh Circuit Court 
of Appeals, Chkago, IL. Oct. 22, 2003. 
366. 351 F.3d 294 (7th Cir. 2003). 
367. ld. 
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World, Inc.,ua which was filed under RICO in 1994 and was still 
pending in 2004, there were approximately seventy defendants, 
including most casino companies, cruise lines with gambling, and slot 
machine manufacturers.369 Aztar was also one of the defendants in 
PoUlOS.370 This case was filed by David Barrett of the New York City 
firm of Barrett, Gravante, Carpinello, and Stern, LLp'm 
In 1995 the district court in Florida transferred Poulos to the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Nevada.372 Powos was brought under 
RICO and alleged "inter alia repeated instances of mail fraud as the 
predicate offenses forming the pattern of racketeering activity engaged 
in by the defendant»373 gambling facilities. In 1997 the Nevada U.S. 
District Court denied, in particular, defendants' motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim,314 and multiple other motions by defendants 
to dismiss the case on various grounds were also generally denied.375 
Accordingly, it would be anticipated that similar challenges by defendant 
Aztar to plaintiff Williams should have been similarly denied or 
dismissed. 
b. "Puffery/, the Magic Dragon: Must RICO Fall Before 
Fantasy? The Seventh Circuit rendered its decision in Williams on 
December 5, 2003.376 The tenor of the decision appeared to be a design 
to chill any RICO cases involving gamblers losses being filed in the 
Seventh Circuit.371 With regard to Aztar's promotional mailings to 
pathological gambler Williams, the court held that the RICO complaint 
failed because "even if the statements in these communications could be 
considered 'false' or 'misrepresentations,' it is clear that they are nothing 
more than sales puffery on which no person of ordinary prudence and 
368. Case No. CV-S-94·1126-DAE (RJJ) (base file), 2002 WL 1991180 (D. Nev. June 25, 
2002). 
369. Poulos Second Complaint, supra nate 119. 
370. Id. at 12. 
371. Id. at 1. 
372. See Fraud UlW3uit, supra note 12l. 
373. Affidavit of John Warren Kindt, Williams v. Aztar Ind. Gaming Corp. (7th Cir. 
Dec. 17, 20(3) (No. 03-1822). Poulos Second Complaint, 3upra nMe ll~. 
374. See ,;upra note 122 and accompanying text. 
375. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.. 
376. 351 F.3d 294 (7th eir. 2003). 
377. [d. For summaries of multiple cases and issues involving federal civil RICO 
actions, see The Merger of Law and Politics in Gambling, supra note 277. 
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comprehension would rely,"378 and then cited to two nongambling cases 
for support.379 
In this pronouncement the court misinterpreted that: (1) generic saJes 
"puffery" or "puffing" to the pathological (addicted) gambler was more 
paralJel to psychological entrapmene80 with Pavlovian aspects;381 (2) 
a pathological gambler does not constitute a person of ordinary prudence 
and comprehension with regard to gambling;382 (3) defendant casino 
allegedly caused or substantially contributed to plaintiff's becoming a 
pathologica1 gambler;8&'! (4) defendant casino allegedly knew that 
plaintiff was a pathological gambler;384 and (5) the very policy of 
enacting RICO was to bring cases such as Williams into the federal court 
system. S86 The court thus made assumptions involving the facts of 
"puffery" as delimited by academics, pathological (addicted) gambling as 
delimited by experts, and the nexus between these elements without 
allowing those facts to be gathered by a trial court. It was unfortunate 
that the Seventh Circuit, which had been so progressive and forward 
thinking in other areas, missed the opportunity to advance or even 
explore t he issues in Wuliam,S.386 
378. 351 F.3d at 299. 
379. Assocs. in AdolescenlP,ychiatry, S.C. v. Home Life Inl. Co., 941 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 
1991) (~ferencing examplel that would be considered generic puffery, but does nol discWl8 
puffery por sa); Reynoldsv. E. Dyer Dev. Co., 882 F.2d 1249, 1252 (7th Cir. 1989) (referring 
to an advertisement extolling a subdivision as ~no more than oommon sales puffing"). 
380. See Professor Emeritu8 Calvin K. Claus, Gambling Behavior: Enticement then 
Addiction, Presentation Before the Illinois Gaming Board (May 8, 2000) [hereinafter 
Pn)fe~or Clausl (on fi le with Illinois Gaming BoDrd). 
381. Id. See generally Crime MuWplier, supro note 61, at 301-04 (~Pavlovian 
Marketing: Hooking New Addicted Gamblen;?"). Gambling marketers cannot reasonably 
chum that they am not. tempted to find the "boob;» ror all gamblers. 
A 1996 article in USA Todoy apparently concluded that gambling marketers were 
intrigued by the search to create gambling'6 "Holy Grail" slot addictive game. Gambling's 
~Holy Grojl» Slot Addictive Gome, 8upro note 139, at AI. 
382. DSM-lY, supra note 3, at 615·18, § 312.81 ("'pathological garnbli~). 
383. Williams Complaint, Bupra note 92. 
384. lei. 
385. For examples orRICO's policy parallels to further judicial goals in the Civil Rights 
Movement, as enumerated by Notre Dame Law Pl'QfC650r Robert Blakey who co-authored 
RlCO, see G. Robert Bltlkey & Thomas A. Perry, An Analysi$ of the Myths Thal BO/8ter 
Effons 10 Rewrite RICO ond the Various Proposa/.& for Reform: *Mother of God-I8 This 
the End of RlCO~, 43 YANO. 1, . REV. 851, 921-24 (1990) {hereinafter Myths to lhwrite 
RICOI. For the policy impact of WiUiGms as already generating changes by gambling 
companies, see Staff Report, Pork Plo~ CasinoS Start Lists to Bon Adddieis. LAs VEGAS 
SUN, Dec. 9, 2003, at AI. 
386. 351 F.3d 294 (7th Cir. 2003). In 1994 American Medical As~ociation Resolution 
430 estimated the socio-medical costa of gambling at $40 billion per year. Am. Med. Ass'n, 
House of Delegates Resolution 430 (A-94) (1994). Adjusted to 2003 dollan;, the MotA', 
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With regard to the interface between sales puffery and the pathologi-
cal gambler, some psychological principles should be reviewed. 
Psychology Professor Calvin Claus has delimited the scientific principles 
involved as beyond controversy.381 In his 2000 testimony before the 
Illinois Gaming Board, Professor Claus cited to the basic textbook 
Schedules of Reinforcement by famed Harvard Psychology Professor B.F. 
Skinner.3S8 The Pavlovian aspects of gambling were summarized as 
"(pJigeon, rat or human, gambling is addictive.,,:)B9 
If you want ro train a laboratory rat to push a hutkm, don't reward 
him with a food pellet after every push-vary the number of pushes 
required for the payoff. Give him a pellet after four pushes one time, 
16 the next, then three, then 23. 
By manipulating the length between payoffs, researchers can lead a 
rat, pigeon or human into addictive behaviors. 
"They could stretch the ratio to the point where that rat would literally 
drop over from exhaustion," [Professor Claus noted].390 
In this context, it was common knowledge that exhausted and oblivious 
gamblers constituted a continuing problem in gambling facilities, 
particularly casinos.391 
"Puffery" must be closely monitored so that it is not fake and 
misJeading. 3911 The most-published academic in the area of "puffing 
and deceptiveness" has summarized the legal policy: "lies" disguised as 
"puffery" should not be permitted anywhere.393 If this is the rule when 
marketing is directed at a totally competent patron or the general public, 
estimate would be approximately $70 billion in costs which is more than the entire 
revenues derived from V.S. gambling of approximately $65 billion. 
In 2003 the Maine Medical Association publicly Opp4J~ the siting of a casino anywhere 
in the state. Maine Medical Ass'n, Public Helli th Comm., &w!u/wn Agains/ Loroting a 
CUSilW in Maine (2003). 
387. Professor Claus, supra note 380. 
388. Set; C.B. FERSTER & B.F. SKINNER, SCHEDULES OF REINFORCEMENT (1957). 
389. Burt Constable, Pigeon, Rat or HUnuln, Gambling is Addictiue, DAlLY HERALD 
tArlingtlJn Heights, IL), May 6, 2000, at B. 
390. ld. 
391. [d. See generally B.F. Skinner, Freedom at Last From the Burden of Taration, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1977, at 29 (ridiculing legalized gambling and its promoters). 
392. Ivan L. Preston, Puffery and Other ·UJophrJle~ Claims: How the Law's "Don't Ask, 
Don't Tell" Policy Condones Fraudulent Falsity in Ad(lerlUiing, 18 J.L. & COM. 49, 49 (1998) 
[hereinafter Puffery and Other "Loophole" Claims]. 
393. [d. See also Ivan L. Preston, The Definition of Derxptiwness in Advertising and 
Other ComTrUlrcial Speech, 39 CATH. V, L. REV. 1035 (1990); Ivan L. Preston & Jef I. 
Richards, Coru;umer MiJ;oompre!teru;wn and Dereptiw Advertising, 68 B.V. L. REv. 431 
(1988). I"or a oomplew analysis of these issues, see IVAN L. PREsToN, THE GREAT 
AMERICAN BLOWUP; PuFFERY IN ADVERTISING AND SELLING (V. Wis. Press 1996). 
= # 
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a fortiori the puffery has crossed into allurement or entrapment when 
the patron is (1) a pathological gambler, (2) known to be a pathological 
gambler by the marketer gambling facility, and (3) specifically target-
marketed by the gambling facility.3~ 
Sociologists and gambling marketers have basically organized 
gamblers into four categories. "Pathological (hooked or addicted) 
gamblers" constitute the first category, and they satisfy a diagnostic 
screen, primarily the South Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS)3M or 
secondarily the Massachusetts Gambling Screen (MAGS)396 or thirdly 
the National Opinion Research Center DSM~1 Screen (NODS), 39S 
Pathological gamblers consist of 1.5 to 2 percent of the public, and 
problem gamblers constitute another 3 to 5 percent of the public. These 
two categories of gamblers lose 26.5 to 55 percent of the monies collected 
by casinos.399 By definition, pathological gamblers will gamble away 
all of their resources and then steal to continue.<IOO 
"Problem gamblers" are delimited as the second-most destructive 
category of gamblers and they satisfy enough of the diagnostic criteria 
in a gambling screen to be considered as gambling destructively. 
Problem gamblers constitute 3 to 5 percent of the public:t01 
"At-risk gamblers" satisfy only one or two of the diagnostic criteria, 
but these gamblers basically are gambling more than they can afford 
394. References to issues involving deceptive advertising as it interfaces with 
regulation by the Federal Trade Commission provides some interesting insights. See 
geMrally Ivan L. Preston, Ertrinsic Evidence in Fechral Trade Commission Deceptiveness 
Caus, 3 COLOM. Bus. L. REV. 633 (1967); Dee Pridgen & Ivan L. Preston, Enhancing the 
Flow of Information in the Marketplace: From Caveat Emptor to Virginia P/wrmacy and 
Beyond at the Federal Trude Commiszion, 14 GA. L. REV. 635 (1980); see al$o Ivan L. 
Preston, The Federal Trade Commission's Identification of Implications as Constitu.ting 
Deceptive Advertising, 57 CINCINNATI L. REV. 1243 (1989); Ivan L. Preston & Jef I. 
Richards, Consumer Miscompreheru;ion as a Challenge to FTC PrQSecutions of Deceptiue 
Advertising, 19 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 605 (1986). 
395. See, e.g., Henry R. Lesieur & Sheila B. Blume, The South Oaks Gambling Screen 
(SOGS): A New Instrument for Identification of PathrJiogiool Gamblers, 144 AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY, September 1987, at 1184-87. In the 1980 pnd 1990s, over two-thirds of all 
studies utilized the SOGS. See, e.g., Harvard Addictions Meta-Analysis, supra note 56, 
App. II. 
396. See, e_g., Harvard Addictions Meta-Analysis, supra note 56, App. rI. 
397. DSM-IV, supra note 3, at 615-18 (whieh NORC used as its basis for a revised 
screen called NODS). 
398. See Nat'l Opinion Res. Center et aI., Gambling Impact and Behavior Study: 
Report to the National Gambling Impact Study Commission (1999). 
399. For a table, see Mega·LAwsuits, su.pra note 2, at 25. For several categories of 
relevant statistics, see Gambling Monies Tainted the Research, supra note 50. 
400. See DSM-N, supra note 3, at 615-16. 
401. See NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 68, at Table 4·2. 
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recreationally. "At-risk gamblers" constitute approximately 5 percent of 
the general public.402 
Finally, the "recreational gambler" constitutes the fourth category. 
Recreational gamblers evidence no adverse effects from gambling. This 
category constitutes roughly 80 percent of the public, but these gamblers 
lose only approximately 30 percent of the dollars collected by casinos. 
By design or not, therefore, the cream markets for gambling facilities are 
pathological and problem gamblers. 
Puffing to the recreational gambler is simple advertising. Ethicists 
might decry or raise problematic scenarios of marketing to at-risk 
gamblers and problem gamblers. However, marketing to pathological 
(addicted) gamblers generates definite self-destructive and commuruty-
destructive behavior. If a gambling facility's marketers are unaware 
that. the pathological gambler is indeed pathological, the marketing 
facility has a defense. However, once the gambling facility has actual or 
constructive notice that a gambler is pathological, any defense should be 
lost. 
Furthermore, the intended target marketing to the known pathological 
gambler (who is virtually helpless to resist) raises issues of mail fraud 
designed to take all of the gambler's resources. In the area of player's 
cards and fun cards, which track the gambler's credit, resource base, and 
degree of gambling, the key question then is when the gambling facility 
had actual or constructive notice that the gambler is pathological. 
This analysis posits that gamblers losing 10 percent of their assets as 
delimited by their credit reports or resources listed on their player's 
cards or fun cards must be (1) stopped by the gambling facilities issuing 
those cards, (2) advised of their rights (including invoking the Statute 
of Anne), and (3) banned from those gambling facilities. Gambling 
facilities miscalculating their "tithes" should be held to criminal 
sanctions for fraud. 
Do gamblers have to lose 100 percent or 50 percent of their assets as 
delimited on the card before the gambling facility has the duty to 
question them and advise them of their rights to be self-banned or 
casino-banned from the facility or placed on a legal list of disassociated 
persons? If gamblers are not so advised, have gamblers been deprived 
of their property by a state-sponsored action without due process of law 
as required by the Fourteenth Amendment? 
402. Id. 
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c. Tracking Cards Issued by Gambling Facilities: Actual or 
Implied Intent to Capture Gamblers' Resources? Issued by 
progressively more gambling facilities during the computer-sophisticated 
twenty-first century, casinos interface fun cards with a gambler's credit 
report which estimates or has actual numbers of ao individual's gross 
worth, net worth, or both. Casinos justified this tactic because they said 
they needed to know whether a person who lost $100,000 could afford 
the I08S. Casinos claim there was no way to know whether the $100,000 
loser was a millionaire or not, but. multi-millionaire gamblers were 
routinely tracked by gambling facilities who designated such gamblers 
"whales" (as compared to "small fish" gamblers), 
More importantly, casino fun cards or player's cards were becoming 
progressively more intrusive into the financial resources linked to 
common business credit reports. In fact, the tracking of gamblers via 
fun cards was goal-oriented toward delimiting each gambler's total 
financial resources. Gamblers hesitating to gamble were "comped" via 
enticements, particularly free alcohol, to keep them gambling (often to 
the gambler's drunken disadvantage via impaircdjudgment).403 
Gambling facilities utilizing player's cards, in particular, have actual 
or constructive knowledge of each cardmember's resource base. At least 
since 1997, the theories of gambling's marketers have been in the public 
domain as exemplified by 71f1U.! Magazine's article, "How Casinos Hook 
You: The Gambling Industry is Creating High-Tech Databases to Reel 
in Compulsive Players.,..j()4 
By purchasing lists from credit card companieA, the casinos know wha~ 
you buy, and then they can track census datu to approximate your 
home value and income. Then there are the direct-mail lists. One 
such list from the early 1990s was baldly [sic) called the "Com pulsive 
Gamblers Special" and promised to deliver 200,000 names of people 
with "unquenchable a ppetites for all forms of gambling." Another list 
features "some 250,000 hardrore gamblers." Yet another purveys the 
names of 80,000 people who responded to a vacation-sweepstakes-
telemarketing pitch.405 
Thus, if the gambler has a resource base of $200,000 and loses $100,000, 
socio-business ethicists should be concerned. However, if a gambler such 
as Williams loses 50 percent of their total financial resources, and the 
gambling facility knows or should know that these gamblers are 
403. See supra note 151·76 and accompanying text. 
404. S.C. Gwynne, How ea,inos Hook You: The Gamblina industry is Creating High· 
Tech Databases to Reel in CompuJsivt Players, TIME, Nov. 17, ]997, at 68-69 [hereinafter 
How CasinO<! Hook YouJ. 
405. [d.. at 69. 
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pathological (addicted) gamblers, the gambling facility should have a 
duty not to take advantage of the addiction. 
A fortiori, if the gambling facility is served with actual written notice 
(from a reasonable source) that the gambler is a pathological "hooked" 
gambler, the gambling facility should have a duty not to impoverish the 
gambler. If the notified gambling facility advertises again or markets 
further to the known pathological gambler. the question is whether that 
marketing constitutes "'puffing," allurement, or entrapment of the 
pathological gambler (who receives the marketing and loses his entire 
financial assets). 
These were the issues in Williams, which the Seventh Circuit Court 
of Appeals apparently misunderstood on oral argument. The court 
merely delimited the gambling facility's marketing as "puffing" and cited 
to two nongambling cases for support.4OEi 
As has been recognized by the common law for hundreds of years and 
as exemplified by the 1710 Statute of Anne to prohibit "Excessive and 
Deceitful GaminCOO via treble damages, gambling involves allurement 
and the entrapment of vulnerable gamblers. 
Professor Ronald J. Faber's 1992 article title summarizes the 
marketing difference: "Money Changes Everything.>KOII In modern 
times, the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders~1YiJ removes most ambiguities and delimits 
that the "pathological gambler," like an alcoholic, can basically only 
resist via psychological help such as provided by Gamblers Anonymous 
(modeled on Alcoholics Anonymous).410 
The pathological gambler cannot disassociate from most direct 
gambling marketing. This scenario has been compared to a bar owner 
knocking on a known alcoholic's door and throwing alcohol in the 
alcoholic's face-with the "intent" of getting the alcoholic back in the bar 
spending money. Numerous academic publications point to the special 
problems of marketing, as they could interface with the gambling 
addict.411 
406. See supra notel:l 378-79 and accompanying text. 
407. See discussion supra notes 318·26 and accompanying text. 
408. lWnald J. Faber, Morwy ChaltjJf8 Euerything, 35 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 809, 810, 814 
(1992) (starting the linkages involving pathological gambling to money and referencing a 
1989 study by gambling expert. Durand Jacobs, Lorna Linda Med. School); see aha Gary A. 
Christenson, M.D., et 81., Compul$ive Buyin&: Descriptive CharoctJ!mtics ond Psychuu~ 
COn"l()rbidity, 55 J. CLINICAL PsYCHIATRY 5 (1994); Thomas C. O'Guinn & Ronald J. Faber, 
Compulsiue Buyin&: A Pherwrruuwlogi.cal E:qJwration, 16 J. CONSUMER REs. 147 (1989). 
409. DSM-IV, supra note 3. 
410. ld. 
411. See, e.g., supra notes 3, 60, 380, 404, 408 and accompanying text. 
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There is no such marketing as "puffing" to a pathological (addicted) 
gambler. The marketing to a known pathological gambler is purposely 
designed to lure if not entrap the pathological gambler- and to rc-Iure 
or entrap the recovering pathological gambler.412 Gambling facilities 
cannot claim that they are unaware that 26.5 percent to 55 percent of 
their "win" comes from pathological and problem gamblers- allegedly the 
cream market percentage,U3 
The legal discovery of the marketing techniques utilized by gambling 
facilities, as was occurring in Poulos, should provide the direct link of 
intent to market to the cream market for gambling facilities! 14 In 
Williams there should have been similar discovery opportunities. It can 
be convincingly argued that intentional marketing to known pathologicaJ 
gamblers can easily qualify as intent to re-hrre or re-entrap to take the 
money of a disadvantaged or financially mentally incompetent. person 
(before some competitor gambling facility does SO).416 
This scenario satisfies t.he tests for mail fraud to establish RICO 
violations, as were suggested by the Seventh Circuit's ruling in Williams . 
However, by comparison, in Poulos, eslablishing such a nexus was 
apparently not required by the Nevada District. Court when it dismissed 
defendants' challenges to plaintiffs' RICO c1aims.416 
Furthermore, the policies behind enacting RICO included initiating 
and promulgating such protections for pathological gamblers-similar to 
the legislative policies that supported and encouraged the Civil Rights 
Movement and antitrust protections.m As enumerated by Notre Dame 
Law Professor Robert Blakey, one of the principal authors of RICO: 
Similarly, when elements opposed to RICO suggest that its subject 
matter be enforced only or mainly criminally, they really mean that it 
be enforced inadequately or not at all . . . . When civil rights legisla-
tion was under consideration in the 1960s, many critics emphasized 
states' rights, which were then, at least for some, only a smokescreen 
behind which UI hide a rotten system of segregation. Criticism of RICO 
based on federalism also looks like a smoke screen behind which the 
swindlers and others seek to hide!IS 
The federal and state judiciaries will eventually be persuaded by such 
policies and incorporate them more pervasively into the common law. 
412. See. e.g .• id.; How Casinos Hoolt You, supra note 404, at 68-69. 
413. For a table by Professor Henry Lesieur, see Mega·Lawsuits, supra note 2, at 25. 
414. See, e.g. , How Cas~ Hook You, supra note 404, at 68-69. 
415. ld. 
416. See, e.g. , supra note 122 and accompanying !.ext. 
417. Myths to Rewrite RICO, supra note 385, at 924. 
418. ld. 
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The most socially-conscious judiciary responding to litigating counsel will 
be the vanguard. For example, the counsel in Williams had a bona fide 
right, even a responsibility, to ask the Seventh Circuit to reconsider its 
earlier decisions.419 
VII. CONCLUSION 
A The 1Jpical Casino Brings in Ouer $1 Million Each Day in 
Customer Losses: Scofflaw Gambling Interests Thereby Dominate and 
Control the Legal and Political Systems 
By 2002, each day of a casino's nonoperation constituted an opportuni-
ty cost of $1 million.4 2l) All laws, regulations, fines, and penalties in 
nonconformity with gambling interests could be ignored because the 
consequences were never more than $1 million per day.421 For exam-
ple. regulatory fines were typically only a few thousand dollars, and 
lawsuits could be settled for "undisclosed amounts" less than $1 million 
per day. 
In an Alice in Wonderland juxtaposition, what was il1egal before the 
legalization of casinos becomes legal. Gambling interests de facto make 
the laws by monetarily dominating the legal and political processes. For 
example, the seizure of someone else's land by casino interests does not 
stop the building processes, and any resulting legal action becomes 
merely a cost of doing business, as exemplified by the Las Vegas 
Downtown Redevelopment Agency v. Pappas422 case in Nevada, lasting 
from 1994 to 2004. With an income of over $1 million per day, casino 
interests seemingly do not care if they win, lose, or sett1e any given 
lawsuit. For example in Rosemont, Illinois, elements of the casino 
construction were initiated and continued despite the violation of Illinois 
regulations and the nonapproval of the Illinois Gaming Board!23 
419. See 'Upnl notes 348·53 and accompanying text. 
420. ~ ,upra note 204 and accompanying text. 
421. See generaJiy Gambling Industry Perpetual Non·Compliarlff, supra note 204. 
422. See, e.,., La! Vegas Downtown Redevelopment Agency v. Pappas, No. A327519 
(l3th Dist. Ct. Nev. 1996). For a summary of the abuses in this case, see Dana Berliner, 
Government Thef/: The Top 10 Abuses of Emim!nt Domain, Castle Coalition (Mar. 2002), 
uuuiloble at http://www.castlecoaliLion.orgltop_IO_abuses!;seeaiscJOrder Granting Motion, 
Motion to Expedite the Briefing and Reoolution or Appeal, Las Vegas Downtown 
Redevelopment Agency v. Pappas {Nev. Sup. Ct. 2002 (No. 39255)); Respondents' Brierat 
3 (No. 33812) (attorneys for ret;pondents, A. Grant Gerber & A!soc., Elko, NV). 
423. See, e.g., Dave Newhart, Rosemont Mayor Looks at OptiOM for Casino, CHI. 
SUN·TiMES, May 4, 2000, at 4. "The casino project is tied up in court in a dispute over 
where the casino should be located. But Rosemont already has begun to build a 
$42 million parking garage and is sending the bills to Emerald Casino, operators or the 
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The socioeconomic history of legalized gambling revealed that these 
types of problems, compounded by corrupt governmental decisionmaking, 
were inherent impacts of government-sanctioned gambling. In common-
law countries in particular, the court systems promised the public some 
relief from "excessive and deceitful gaming," 
With decriminalized gambling spreading throughout the United States 
and the world, the solutions appeared to be predicated upon large 
punitive damage awards and treble damages. As ga mbling facilities 
earned millions of daUars per day and as accounting and regulatory 
systems historically degenerated into ineffective ~window dressings,""'zt 
the last solutions to restrain the progambling interests were the specters 
of large punitive damage awards and tr eble damages. Probably one of 
the first. if not the first, instances of treble damages was legislation in 
1710 with the Statute of Anne. Treble damages. like the punitive 
damages which developed later, were designed to punish and deter 
inappropriate behaviors. In the twenty-first century. U.S. gambling 
facilities were vulnerable to mega-damages predicated on mega-lawsuits. 
B. "'Follow the Money" as the Threshold 'lest of Credibility in 
Gambling Issues: Directly Ask Whether the Person Interviewed Has or 
Expects to Directly or Indirectly Benefit Financially from the Gambling 
Industry 
The socioeconomic history oflegalized gambling has demonstrated that 
gambling monies have invalidated decisionmaking in mUltiple areas.4U 
Independent analysts in t he twenty-first century needed to follow the 
money to recognize the "gold fever" mesmerizing many decisionmakers 
dealing with legalized gambling.426 Once under oath in legal discovery 
proposed Rosemont casino.- /d.; Se/!! Tim Novak, Mob fu$ Sink /WIwmont CasIIW, CHI. 
SUN-TIMEs, Jan. 31, 2001, at 1; Set also Michael Higgins & Douglas Holt, Gaming Boord 
R(JI!cta Rosemcmt Casmo Bid, Cm. TlU:o. , Jan. 31, 2001, § 1, at 1. 
424. For examples of regulat.ory problems, Sefl Brett Pulley, TM Spinning D(](>r: A 
Specw/ Report; RegulatoN Find EaiJY Path to Gambling Industry Jobs, N.Y. TiMES, Oct. 28, 
1998, at AI. 
425. Id..; see supra note 49 and accompanying text. See all(! When Gambling Camel to 
Town, supra note 49, at 36-38; Casino Backku;h. supra note 28. a t. AI. See generally 
Loretta Tofani, Gambli1l/J IndU$try SI!t!M a Winnin.!: 1mtJBf!, PHILA.. INQUIRER, J uly 6, 1998, 
at AI ; David L. Wheeler, A Surge of &search on. Gambling is Financed in Part by the 
Indll.stl")' IUJe/{, ClmON. HIOUER Eouc., Mar. 5, 1999, at A1 7, A18. Sevel1l1 articles in the 
LA. Timell ran each day beginning the week of December 13, 1998. See, e.g., Callino 
BackLuh, supra note 28; Matea Gold, Treatment OptlOIlS &aree for Gamblers, L.A. TIMES, 
Dec. 15, 1998, at AI; Apnl Lynch, All Betll Are Off, MOTHER JONES, July/Aug. 1997, at 
88-39; April Lynch, Heav, Betting, MOTIIER JONES, July/Aug. 1997, at 40-41. 
426. See, e.g. , supra note 49 and accompanying ten. 
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and thereafter sworn in court, U.S. gambling interests knew t hey would 
be disadvantaged regarding plaintiffs' claims,427 
427. In Williams, for ro:ample, sworn expert testimony would have been revealing. By 
comparison, in 2000 the senior vice president of marketing for Harrah's caainos, Rich 
Minnan, summarized the marketing philosophy and techniques utilized by his company. 
Once the new gambler", come out of the introductory program of marketing and gathering 
information from them, Minnan eltplains gour 'Pavlovian' marketing takes over. Here we 
have a mathematical model that tells U6 what appeals to spedfic gamblers based on data 
tracking their previous behavior at our propertieli. Our computer is programmed to spit 
out behavior modifieation reports that target customen> ....• ROBERT L. SHOOK, JACKPOT!: 
HARRAH's WlNh1NG SECRETS FOR CUSTOMER LOYALTY 231, 310 (John Wiley & Sons. Pub. 
2003) (section titled -A PavlovJan Approach to Marketing"l. 
Unlike some other gambling facilities, Minnan indicated that on Harrah's player's cards, 
"we don't have any income or credit information (unless they [the gamblem] Specifically 
sign up for credit). ~ Id. at 232. 
However, any gambler who seeks credit for continued gambling has automatically 
fulfilled one (and perhaps three) of the ten diagnostic criteria established by the American 
Psychiatric Association for a ·pathological gambler· (as well as for a · problem gambl er~). 
DSM-IV, stlpra note 3, at 615-18. Furthermore, satisfying just this one criterion almost 
automatically satisfies the diagnostic criteria for an ~at.-risk· gambler pursuant to the U.S. 
National Research Council and the U.S. National Gambling Commission. NGISC FlNAL 
REPORT, IJtlpra note 68, at 4·2, 4-6. 
Accordingly, gambling facilities monitoring, assisting, or granting any gambler credit 
over $100 have constructive knowledge that the gambler has: ( 1) automatically satisfied 
the diagn~ti c criteria for an "at-risk- gambler, (2) probably satisfies the diagnostic criteria 
for a Gproblem gambler" (i.e., satisfies 3 or 4 criteria), and (3) couJd easily satisfy the 
diagnostic criteria for a ~pathologieal (addicted) gambler" (I.e., satisfies 5 or more criteria). 
Theoretically, any gambling facility grantingcredit(particuJarly oyer $200) to a gamble has 
actual or constructive knowledge that the gambler is problematic. See ' tlpra notes 395-419 
and accompanying text. 
For examples of the Indiana Legislature's response to public pressure to enact a common-
law duty by casinos to pathological gamblers as generated by Wiilia11l8, see Statement of 
Walter Schulz, Indiana Coalition Against Legalized Gambling, before the Indiana Gaming 
Commission, Sept. 12,2003; Lesley Stedman Weidenbener, Tougher Gambler Ban Program 
Urged: Indiana Casinos Should Monitor Excessiue Losses, Lobbyilt Insigts, COURIER-J. 
(Louisville, KY), Oct. 25, 2003; Lesley Stedman, Self-Imposed Bans On Gamblers Studied: 
AU 10 CalJmos in tM State Will Sharf Lilltll, COURl£R-J (Louisville, KYl, July 12, 2003; 
Editorial, Gamblers BeWUrf: It'll Still YQtlr Fatllt,lNolANAPOLIS STAR, Mar. 12,2003; Russ 
Pulliam, The Gambling Industry, Like Tob<wro, CotlldEnd Up Liable, I NDIANAPOLIS STAR, 
Mar. 2, 2003. 
